THE UNITED STATES AND SUDAN

THE UNITED STATES, SUDAN AND COUNTERTERRORISM: A CASE STUDY

“[T]he strike in regards to the Khartoum chemical plant cannot be justified…These are pretty harsh words. I know one thing for sure. The intelligence agencies of other countries look at that and they think, ‘Wait a minute, if you hit the wrong target or if in fact the justification was not accurate, it is either ineptitude or, to get back to the wag-the-dog theory, something else is going on. That gets to our credibility. And that is why both the administration and the Congress must insist on a foreign policy where if you draw a line in the sand, if you make a statement, your credibility is tremendously important.”

U.S. Senator Pat Roberts [1]

“You cannot have people saying ‘We have proof of certain things’ against a whole country but nobody knows what that proof is. There is a difference between whether something is proved sufficiently to bring a man before a court…and whether it is sufficient to prove to adopt one’s political line.”

Raymond Kendall, International Secretary-General of Interpol [2]

“A politicized [terrorism] list makes people doubt your objectivity”.

Ambassador Robert Oakley, former State Department counterterrorist coordinator [3]

In his address to the joint session of Congress and the American people in the week following the murderous terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, President George Bush declared that the war on terrorism would be the single most important struggle facing the United States and its allies: “We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.” [4] Even before the horrific events of 9/11, the previous Clinton Administration also repeatedly stated that counter-terrorism lay at the heart of its foreign policy. President Clinton devoted a number of key-note speeches to the subject, including a 1995 address marking United Nations’ 50th anniversary, when he spoke of the terrorists who had “plotted to destroy the very hall we gather in today.” [5] His administration was said to have doubled counter-terrorist spending across 40 departments and agencies. [6] This was said to have marked the Clinton Administration as “the first to undertake a systematic anti-terrorist effort, in terms of resources and anti-terrorist activity.” [7]

For the global war on terrorism to succeed those at the heart of this struggle must learn from mistakes that have been made in counter-terrorism and with regard to the function and nature of the intelligence which plays such a central role in this war. Sudan provides many lessons in this respect. In any examination of the war on terrorism, and particularly the role of the United States in the war on terrorism – both before and after the 11 September 2001 attacks – Sudan provides a compelling case study in systemic American policy and intelligence failure, from which much can be learned. It was a failure which also extended to false claims of Sudanese involvement with weapons of mass destruction. If the international community is to succeed in the war on terror and the eradication of weapons of mass destruction these are mistakes which must not be repeated. As Senator Roberts pointed out in the comments cited above, American intelligence and policy failures with regard to Sudan has undermined the credibility of the United States and its assertions, even amongst key NATO allies.

The Importance of Sudan
Sudan is uniquely placed with regard to counter-terrorism for at least two simple reasons. As a country with neighbours including Egypt, Libya, Chad, Uganda and – across the Red Sea – Saudi Arabia, it is strategically placed, bridging the Middle East, Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The importance of the Sudanese government in supporting the war on terrorism within this political environment is self-evident. The second reason is perhaps even more important. Milton Viorst, author of Sandcastles: The Arabs in Search of the Modern World, has noted that “Sudan is the only state in our age that has formally opted for Islam as its system of government”. As such Sudan attracted numerous Islamist visitors from a wide variety of Islamic schools of thought, both political and religious. Islamist models of government were also intensely debated at regular conferences held in Sudan in the early 1990s under the auspices of Islamist ideologue, Dr Hasan al-Turabi. [8] A number of individuals and political organisations that would subsequently cross the line and become identified with acts of terrorism visited Sudan in those years. Osama bin-Laden himself lived in Sudan from 1991 until 1996, until asked to leave Sudan by the Khartoum authorities. He subsequently went on to launch his terrorist campaign from Afghanistan.

It is also the case that the United States and others in the international community committed to the war on terrorism need to engage positively within the Islamic world. There is a search for Islamic models of government which are receptive to Western values. Sudan is precisely such a country. Professor Tim Niblock, one of the foremost British experts on Islam and Sudan, has pointed out two areas in which Sudan’s model differs from mainstream Islamist thought. One is the Sudanese Islamists’ “explicit acceptance of liberal democracy as the appropriate form of political organisation for Sudan. The advocacy of liberal democracy…went well beyond the stress which Islamist movements customarily place on the need for shura (consultation).” Secondly, the Sudanese model with regard to women is “qualitatively different from that proposed in most Islamist programmes. The emphasis is on women ‘escaping from social oppression’ and ‘playing a full part in building the new society’, rather than on their primary duty lying within the family”. [9] That Sudan is in a new phase of its history is clear. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in early 2005, ended decades of north-south civil war in Sudan. The agreement also makes provision for democratic elections throughout Sudan – another key component in Western engagement within the Islamic world.

That Sudan has played and continues to play a pivotal role in the war on terrorism is largely unrecognised and unreported. Glimpses of Sudan’s importance to the war on terrorism, and its repeated attempts to assist, have emerged from time-to-time. [10] In April 2005, The Los Angeles Times reported that the Bush Administration has “forged a close intelligence partnership” with Sudan, assistance which included sharing intelligence and providing access to terrorism suspects. The Administration noted that Sudan’s assistance is “important, functional and current” and that the Sudanese intelligence service could become a “top tier” partner of the CIA. The head of the Sudanese intelligence service was quoted as saying that: “We have a strong partnership with the CIA”. [11]

Despite this recognition of the importance of Sudan in the war on terrorism, even current American policy towards Khartoum continues to reflect the flawed approach that has characterised Washington’s position regarding Sudan. At the heart of this systemic failure has been a tendency to play politics with regard to claims of terrorism, systemic intelligence failure including both poor and politicised intelligence, together with false claims of involvement with weapons of mass destruction, and errors in judgement on the part of the Clinton Administration – failures which have also continued to a lesser degree under the Bush Administration. These flaws led to the mishandling of potentially pivotal counter-terrorism opportunities. [12]

Crying Wolf: Playing Politics with Terrorism:
For what were at best questionable motives, the Clinton Administration chose to destabilise Sudan economically, militarily and diplomatically. As part of this policy Washington sought to isolate the Khartoum government. To this end, in August 1993, the Clinton Administration placed Sudan on its official list of state sponsors of international terrorism. Administration officials lost no opportunity of repeating claims that Sudan was a sponsor of international terrorism. [13] Virtually every press item on Sudan mentions, at least in passing, that Sudan is on this list or has otherwise been accused of involvement in terrorism. Whatever other states on the list may or may not have done, Sudan was listed despite the fact that there was not a single example of Sudanese involvement in any act of international terrorism. That Sudan was listed without any evidence of its alleged support for terrorism – as much was confirmed before and after the listing is a matter of record. [14] Objective American observers of events at the time have said that they did not believe Sudan warranted such a listing. Former United States President Jimmy Carter, long interested in Sudanese affairs, went out of his way to see what evidence there was for Sudan’s listing. Carter was told there was no evidence:

“In fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state he said they did not have any proof, but there were strong allegations.” [15]

It would appear that Don Petterson, the American ambassador to Sudan at the time, was not even briefed prior to the decision to list Sudan being taken. When he queried the decision, he was told by an assistant secretary of state that the “new evidence was conclusive”. [16] The assistant secretary of state briefing Ambassador Petterson would have been the same assistant secretary of state who told former President Carter a few days later that the Clinton Administration did not have any evidence, but that there were “strong allegations”. [17] In any event, Petterson stated that he was “surprised” that Sudan was put on the terrorism list. Petterson also confirmed that there was no conclusive evidence to warrant the listing. [18]

Patterns of Global Terrorism is the mandatory annual US government report on terrorism. In 1992, the year before Sudan’s listing, the report stated that: “There is no evidence that the Government of Sudan conducted or sponsored a specific terrorist attack in the past year, and the government denies supporting any form of terrorism activity” [19] The 1993 Patterns of Global Terrorism, the first report which included Sudan on this list, clearly stated that “there is no conclusive evidence linking the Government of Sudan to any specific terrorist incident during the year”. [20] The 1994 Patterns of Global Terrorism once again noted that: “There is no evidence that Sudan, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), conducted or sponsored a specific act of terrorism in 1994”. [21]

There can be no doubt that Sudan’s 1993 listing as a state sponsor of terrorism by the United States fundamentally undermined Washington’s credibility with regard to terrorism. American anti-terrorism legislation should provide an unassailable, black and white legal framework within which to combat terrorism – all the more so given the Bush Administration’s declaration that the war on terrorism is a moral crusade. The simple fact is that the Clinton Administration’s listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, in the clear absence of any proof or evidence of such activity, was an abuse of United States anti-terrorism legislation for what were in any instance questionable policy reasons. The comments of Raymond Kendall, International Secretary-General of Interpol, on claims in these circumstances, are telling: “You cannot have people saying ‘We have proof of certain things’ against a whole country but nobody knows what that proof is. There is a difference between whether something is proved sufficiently to bring a man before a court…and whether it is sufficient to prove to adopt one’s political line.” [22]

It is also worth noting the extent to which inclusion on the list is dependent on political considerations (as opposed to actual involvement in terrorism) at any one moment in time. Iraq, for example, was first listed in 1979, was de-listed in 1982 when it went to war against Iran, something seen as being in the American interest, and was put back on after the Gulf war. Nothing had changed in the meantime – Saddam Hussein’s government was in power throughout. Expediency had dictated Iraq’s removal and then relisting. [23] In other words, putting politics before reality.

Any detailed examination of the Clinton Administration’s claims of Sudan’s alleged involvement in sponsoring international terrorism exposes the almost unbelievable shallowness of such allegations. [24] The continuing absence of any intelligence to support the Clinton Administration’s allegations of Sudanese involvement in terrorism was obvious. In a 26 December 1996 International Herald Tribune article by veteran American investigative reporter Tim Weiner, for example, it was clear that no evidence or proof had emerged: “U.S. officials have no hard proof that Sudan still provides training centers for terrorists”. Mr Weiner also interviewed key American officials “responsible for analyzing the Sudan”. The answer to whether or not Sudan was involved in supporting terrorism, was “we just don’t know”. Sudan, nevertheless, continued to be listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Perversely, despite the continuing absence of any evidence of Sudanese involvement in international terrorism, the Clinton Administration escalated its “terrorism” claims. On 3 November 1997, citing claims of Sudanese “involvement” in terrorism, President Clinton signed executive order 13067, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703 et seq) and the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641 c), which imposed comprehensive trade and economic sanctions against Sudan, declaring “that the policies of Sudan constitute an extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States”. [25]

The Administration claimed that these sanctions were introduced as “direct consequence of the Sudanese regime’s sponsorship of international terrorism”. [26]

The terrorism list has itself come under criticism from within the United States from academia, media and former counter-terrorism experts. The US News & World Report has stated that “four former State Department counterterrorism coordinators have stated that the terrorism list “is too blunt, too rigid, and too often corrupted by political considerations”. [27] The Los Angeles Times has quoted a senior US government official familiar with terrorist threats in the region as stating that Sudan was not at present a state sponsor of terrorism: “they have gone a long way past a passing grade on counter-terrorism cooperation and they don’t technically belong on the list.” [28] Professor Marina Ottaway, an international affairs specialist at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for Peace, has noted that politics outweighed good judgement as far as the terrorism list was concerned. [29]

That the Bush Administration chose to continue both with Sudan’s listing as a “state sponsor” of terrorism and comprehensive sanctions – particularly in the face of clear and ongoing Sudanese cooperation in counter-terrorism – clearly demonstrates poor judgement, is disappointing and once again only serves to undermines American credibility regarding the war on terrorism. That Washington has continued to play politics with terrorism is clear, with Bush Administration officials stating that Sudan would come off the “terrorism list” if they signed a peace agreement ending the war in southern Sudan. [30] American credibility continues to be brought into question in as much as the peace agreement has signed and Sudan still remains on the list.

Intelligence Failure
Intelligence is at the heart of any counter-terrorism policy. The extent of the Clinton Administration’s intelligence failure regarding Sudan was breathtaking, from which there are clear lessons to be learnt. American intelligence failure with regard to Sudan was in at least two areas. One was simple intelligence failure – an inability to correctly assess or analyse events in Sudan, either politically or with regard to Sudan’s value in analysing or countering terrorism. The second area of failure was the use of politicised intelligence – the use of selective intelligence reports (themselves subsequently revealed to have been inaccurate) in justifying and pursuing a policy of isolating and destabilising Sudan.

The degree of American intelligence failure regarding Sudan was revealed in part when, in 1998, it was admitted that at least one hundred CIA reports on Sudan and terrorism were scrapped as unreliable or having been fabricated. [31] The number of reports discounted may in reality have run into the hundreds. The CIA had realised that the reports in question had been fabricated, probably by political opponents of the government or other anti-Sudanese forces or simply for financial gain. It is clear that the American intelligence agencies were either unable or disinclined to check the accuracy of their sources, and were all too eager to rely on information of dubious quality because it supported the Clinton Administration’s preconceived ideas with regard to Sudan. Presumably, these reports, exploited for political reasons, had been at the heart of Sudan’s listing as a state sponsor of terrorism.

The politicisation of intelligence with regard to Sudan was clear to see in the wake of the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. In a remarkably clumsy way, the Clinton Administration has sought from time to time to insinuate that Sudan was somehow involved in the bombing. Given the Clinton Administration’s obvious eagerness to attribute any act of terrorism to Sudan, it is clear that had there been the slightest evidence of the Sudanese government’s involvement in such a direct attack on the United States, it would not only have immediately trumpeted it around the world, but savage retaliation would have followed. In its attempts to implicate Sudan in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Clinton Administration contradicted itself on several occasions. In March 1993, for example, the United States government stated that the World Trade Center bombing was carried out by a poorly trained local group of individuals who were not under the auspices of a foreign government or international network. [32] In June 1993, the American authorities again stated there was no evidence of foreign involvement in the New York bombing or conspiracies. [33] As a means of justifying its listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, the American government then reversed its position in August 1993 alleging Sudanese involvement in the New York bomb plots. [34] This finding was then comprehensively contradicted in 1996 by Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr., the Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism. On the occasion of the release of the 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, on 30 April 1996, Ambassador Wilcox made it very clear that there was no Sudanese involvement whatsoever in the World Trade Center bombings:

“We have looked very, very carefully and pursued all possible clues that there might be some state sponsorship behind the World Trade Center bombing. We have found no such evidence, in spite of an exhaustive search, that any state was responsible for that crime. Our information indicates that Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his gang were a group of freelance terrorists, many of whom were trained in Afghanistan, who came from various nations but who did not rely on support from any state.” [35]

Yet, earlier that month, on 3 April 1996, the then American ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, in meetings at the United Nations, claimed that two Sudanese diplomats had been involved in the World Trade Center bombing, and other “plots”. [36] This presents an interesting situation. Mrs Albright’s political line contradicted by the professional anti-terrorism expert, Ambassador Wilcox. On something as serious as allegations of terrorism, allegations involving the murderous bombing of the World Trade Center and a conspiracy to bomb other targets in New York, such a divergence is extraordinary and yet again only but undermines the credibility of American claims with regard to Sudanese “involvement” in terrorism.

A striking example of ongoing American intelligence failure on Sudan was the closure by the Clinton Administration of the American embassy in Khartoum in 1996. This decision was presented as yet one more example of concern over Sudan’s alleged support for international terrorism. CIA reports were said to have stated that American embassy staff and their families were in danger. [37] The Clinton Administration’s spokesman, Nicholas Burns, stated at the time that:

“We have been concerned for a long period of time about the activities and movements of specific terrorist organizations who are resident in Sudan. Over the course of many, many conversations with the Sudanese Government, we simply could not be assured that the Sudanese Government was capable of protecting our Americans against the specific threats that concerned us…The specific nature of these threats, the persistence of these threats, and our root belief at the end of all these conversations that this particular government could not protect them led us to take this extraordinary measure of withdrawing all of our diplomats.” [38]

It is now admitted the reports cited in justifying this decision were subsequently withdrawn as having been fabricated. As the New York Times investigation documented:

“In late 1995 the CIA realized that a foreign agent who had warned repeatedly of startling terrorist threats to U.S. diplomats, spies and their children in Khartoum was fabricating information. They withdrew his reports, but the climate of fear and mistrust created by the reports bolstered the case for withdrawing personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, officials said…The embassy remained closed, even though, as a senior intelligence official put it, ‘the threat wasn’t there’ as of 1996.” [39]

The New York Times also reported that there were similar unverified and uncorroborated reports that the then national security advisor, Antony Lake, had been targeted for assassination by terrorists based in Sudan. Lake was moved into Blair House, a federal mansion across the street from the White House and then to a second, secret, location. The New York Times reported that Lake “disappeared from view around the time the embassy’s personnel were withdrawn”. There is little doubt that the supposed threat to Lake was as fabricated as the CIA reports concerning the American embassy in Khartoum. The newspaper stated that: “The threat to Tony Lake had a chilling effect on the National Security Council.”

There is no doubt that the equally spurious “threats” to American diplomats and their children in Khartoum had an equally chilling effect on the State Department and other agencies. The fact remains however that these “threats”, then seen as proof of Sudanese complicity in terrorism, were contained in the over one hundred reports that the CIA later admitted it had to withdraw because they had been fabricated. To have to withdraw one or two intelligence reports on such serious matters is bad enough. To have to withdraw over one hundred such reports can only be described as a massive systemic intelligence failure. One can only but point out that the Clinton Administration used the Sudanese government’s inability to react to “specific” threats made by “specific” terrorist organisations against American diplomats – non-existent, fabricated threats – as examples both of Sudan’s involvement with terrorism and non-cooperation.

The American embassy in Khartoum was subsequently partly re-opened in October 1997, and Antony Lake eventually did come out of hiding. And yet, as late as March 2000, four years after the above intelligence fiasco, the White House was still falsely stating: “In 1996, we removed fulltime staff from the Embassy and relocated them to Nairobi for security reasons.” [40] In what could pass for a snapshot of the accuracy of Clinton Administration claims about Sudan and terrorism in general, the New York Times stated that:

“the Central Intelligence Agency…recently concluded that reports that had appeared to document a clear link between the Sudanese Government and terrorist activities were fabricated and unreliable…The United States is entitled to use military force to protect itself against terrorism. But the case for every such action must be rigorously established. In the case of the Sudan, Washington has conspicuously failed to prove its case.” [41]

Ambassador Petterson, the United States ambassador to Sudan from 1992-95, clearly documents an earlier example of the Clinton Administration acting upon fabricated and unreliable claims of Sudanese complicity in “terrorism”. In his memoirs of his time in Sudan Ambassador Petterson reveals that in August 1993, “information about a plan to harm American officials led the State Department to order an evacuation of our spouses and children and a reduction of my American staff by one-third”. Petterson stated that “we at the embassy had seen or heard nothing manifesting a clear and present danger from either terrorists or the Sudanese government. But the order was firm and irrevocable”. [42] Petterson also documented that subsequently “new information” had been “acquired” which indicated “an increasingly precarious situation for Americans in Khartoum”. Ambassador Petterson later reveals that the allegations in question were unfounded:

“The months wore on, no credible threat to embassy Americans materialized, and eventually serious doubt was raised about the validity of the information that had led to the evacuation.” [43]

It perhaps goes without saying that for a government to evacuate the spouses and children of diplomats, and to reduce its embassy staff, is a serious matter. It is an even more serious matter when a government totally closes an embassy, withdrawing all diplomats and dependants. This was done on two occasions in Sudan. The partial evacuation happened in 1993. The total evacuation was carried out in 1996. The Clinton Administration ordered both evacuations on the basis of intelligence information received which supposedly warned of threats to American diplomats and their families. On both occasions the Administration also demanded that the Sudanese government somehow deal with these threats, and it was inferred that if Khartoum did not do so this would be more evidence of Sudan’s involvement with terrorism. It is now clear, as outlined by independent sources such as Ambassador Petterson, and the New York Times, that both the partial evacuation of American embassy staff and dependants in 1993, and the full withdrawal of the embassy in 1996, were the results of faulty intelligence reports based on claims subsequently revealed to have been fabricated.

The yawning gap between American claims about Sudan and terrorism, and reality, was also clearly demonstrated by the American cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa medicine factory in Khartoum in 1999. The Clinton Administration claimed, amongst other things, that the factory was involved in the production of weapons of mass destruction and that it was linked to Osama bin- Laden. Every single American claim about the al-Shifa factory was proven – largely by the American media itself – to have been false. [44] Despite initially claiming that the factory was owned by bin Laden, Clinton Administration officials subsequently admitted that when they attacked the factory they did not know who the owner was, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering stating that who owned the plant “was not known to us”. When, several days later, the American government learnt, from subsequent media coverage of the attack, who actually owned the factory, that person, Mr Saleh Idris, was then retrospectively listed under U.S. legislation dealing with “specially designated terrorists”. On 26 August, 1998, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the unit within the U.S. Treasury Department charged with the enforcement of anti-terrorism sanctions, froze more than US$ 24 million of Mr Idris’s assets. These assets had been held in Bank of America accounts. On 26 February 1999, Mr Idris filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, for the release of his assets, claiming that the government’s actions had been unlawful. His lawyers stated that while the law used by the Clinton Administration to freeze his assets required a finding that Mr Idris was, or had been, associated with terrorist activities, no such determination had ever been made. Mr Idris, an opponent of the Khartoum government, had never had any association whatsoever with terrorists or terrorism. On 4 May 1999, the deadline by which the government had to file a defence in court, the Clinton Administration backed down and had to authorise the full and unconditional release of his assets. [45] The listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism provides a macro example of the Clinton Administration’s abuse of antiterrorist legislation. The case of Mr Idris provides a micro example of this misuse. The Clinton Administration’s clear abuse of anti-terrorist legislation and its manipulation and abuse of legal measures for political expediency and convenience was not just immoral; it discredited American anti-terrorist legislation internationally.

In the weeks and months following the al-Shifa bombing, the Sudan repeatedly called on the United Nations and United States to inspect the remains of the factory for any evidence of chemical weapons production. The Americans steadfastly refused to inspect the site. The irony of such a position was no lost on the international community given that in 1998, the United States and Britain militarily attacked (and would ultimately invade) Iraq because that country would not allowed the inspection of certain factories and the remains of factories, but when the Sudanese requested a similar inspection of a site claimed to have been a chemical weapons factory, the Clinton Administration pointedly refused. The Washington Post quoted a Sudanese diplomat at the United Nations: “You guys bombed Iraq because it blocked U.N. weapons inspectors. We’re begging for a U.N. inspection and you’re blocking it.” [46]

The observations of U.S. Senator Pat Roberts regarding the al-Shifa fiasco bear repeating: “[T]he strike in regards to the Khartoum chemical plant cannot be justified…These are pretty harsh words. I know one thing for sure. The intelligence agencies of other countries look at that and they think, ‘Wait a minute, if you hit the wrong target or if in fact the justification was not accurate, it is either ineptitude or, to get back to the wag-the-dog theory, something else is going on. That gets to our credibility. And that is why both the administration and the Congress must insist on a foreign policy where if you draw a line in the sand, if you make a statement, your credibility is tremendously important.” [47]

The Clinton Administration’s claims about Sudan were further exposed by articles published in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The American magazine Vanity Fair, and The Financial Times and The Observer newspapers in Britain reported that Sudan had attempted to actively cooperate with the United States with regard to al-Qaeda and Osama bin- Laden for several years and had been repeatedly rebuffed by Washington before being acted upon in part by Washington in 2000. [48] Moreover, in November 2001, The Washington Post also publicly revealed that in 1996 Sudan offered to extradite Osama bin-Laden to the United States, just as Khartoum had extradited Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, “Carlos the Jackal”, to France in 1994. Amazingly, the offer was declined. [49] After several years of declining repeated Sudanese invitations for American intelligence and counter-terrorist personnel to come to Sudan and investigate whatever they wanted to, joint CIA, FBI and State Department counter-terrorism and intelligence teams have been in Sudan continuously, at Khartoum’s request, since early 2000, almost eighteen months before the attacks on 11 September 2001. [50] The Observer confirmed that in May 2001 these teams had given Sudan “a clean bill of health” with regard to allegations of terrorism. In August 2001 Bush Administration officials further confirmed that the Sudanese-American cooperation on counter-terrorism had been positive. [51] This American-Sudanese intelligence cooperation was said to have “covered everything”. [52] In fact, based on these extensive investigations, the United States had agreed to the lifting of the limited United Nations sanctions on Sudan. [53] The then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner confirmed that Sudan had been co-operating with the United States for some time before the World Trade Center attacks, and that this cooperation had reached new levels since 11 September: “We appreciate Khartoum’s relationship with us.”
[54] The Clinton Administration’s projections were exposed for the propaganda they had been.

A pattern of intelligence failure regarding Sudan continued at least until 2002, with the United States intelligence agencies continuing to accept at face value claims by paid sources that Khartoum was engaged in terrorist conspiracies against the Washington. These claims, including an alleged plot to crash an airplane into the Bush White House, were conclusively shown to have been false in Richard Miniter’s 2005 book, Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror. [55] Miniter documents how, despite years of faulty and discredited intelligence emanating from paid sources in Sudan in the 1990s, American intelligence continued to rely, at least until 2002, on Sudanese sources again subsequently revealed to have made up false claims of terrorist involvement for financial gain.

Putting Domestic Politics before the War on Terrorism
There is little doubt that that American domestic policy issues – certainly with regard to Sudan – have clearly on occasion been prioritised above the much heralded “war on terrorism”, during both the Clinton and Bush administrations. The anti-Sudan lobby in Washington, deeply rooted as it was within Congress, undoubtedly pressured the Clinton administration to destabilise and isolate Sudan, echoing claims of Sudanese involvement in terrorism. This pressure made it difficult for American intelligence agencies to accept repeated Sudanese offers to share intelligence and cooperate in counter-terrorism. Newsweek observed that CIA officials did not dare “to launch operations that could get them hauled before a congressional inquisition.” [56] The US News & World Report has confirmed this sort of skewed influence on anti-terrorism legislation, noting that those officials responsible for the terrorist listing are reluctant to propose any changes “because they know they would be overruled by higher-ups at…Congress who are captive to the lobbies that track who’s on and who’s off [the list]. For example, the Christian lobby resists revision of Sudan’s status…” [57]

It is also evident that the Bush Administration has chosen to put domestic politics before the effective prosecution of the war on terrorism. In September 2004, the Bush administration chose to label the tragic conflict in Darfur as “genocide”, an act that can only be seen as hostile and which badly damaged the Government of Sudan, in order to please the Christian right political constituency within the United States. This was admitted by former Senator Jack Danforth, President Bush’s special envoy to Sudan, in an interview with the BBC in July 2005. [58] And the claim of genocide was one which was contradicted by observers who were far better placed to form an objective judgement. Such claims run contrary to statements made by groups such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the biggest aid agency in Darfur. Dr Mercedes Taty, the deputy emergency director of MSF, has stated: “I don’t think that we should be using the word ‘genocide’ to describe this conflict. Not at all. This can be a semantic discussion, but nevertheless, there is no systematic target - targeting one ethnic group or another one. It doesn’t mean either that the situation in Sudan isn’t extremely serious by itself.” [59] MSF President Dr Jean-Hervé Bradol had also previously stated that the use of the term genocide was inappropriate: “Our teams have not seen evidence of the deliberate intention to kill people of a specific group.” [60]

Labelling the Darfur crisis as genocide may have succeeded in pleasing right-wing constituencies and diverting media attention away from the disastrous events in Iraq – it was a simple enough equation – but it needlessly badly damaged a key ally in the war on terrorism. [61] And, ironically, in so doing the administration strengthened the position of the key rebel movement involved in the Darfur conflict, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). JEM is widely seen as an ultra-Islamist movement closely identified with Dr Turabi and is opposed to any engagement with the United States, especially on counter-terrorism.

Conclusions
The lessons of the United States’ approach to Sudan with regard to terrorism and counter-terrorism during both the Clinton and Bush administrations are clear. The Clinton administration’s misuse of US federal legislation, for example the listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in the absence of any evidence supporting this move, undermined US credibility on terrorism in the eyes of its allies and others within the international community. Sudan’s continued listing, and the use of claims of “terrorism” for domestic or other political reasons, continues to undermine American credibility in the war on terrorism. The US News & World Report has reported that experts have noted that “creating a believable list is important…if the United States is to gather international support for sanctions or military action”. Ambassador Robert Oakley, a former senior United States anti-terrorist coordinator, has admitted that a politicized list makes people doubt American credibility: “A politicized list makes people doubt your objectivity”. [62] There is no place for contradictory messages in the war on terrorism. Any such contradiction merely aids the terrorists, their supporters and those who have chosen to pursue a policy of indifference or hostility to American foreign policy.

The need for accurate and up-to-date intelligence in the war on terrorism is crystal clear. Sudan has provided and continues to provide vital information in this war. The dangers of politicised or faulty intelligence were spelt out in the disastrous 1998 attack on the al-Shifa factory. This further weakened US credibility internationally. The lessons of al-Shifa – the reliance upon questionable and politicised intelligence about alleged weapons of mass destruction – were clearly not taken on board given that similar American claims were made in the lead-up to the war in Iraq in 2003 – claims which ultimately destroyed the international consensus even amongst US allies with regard to the Iraq conflict. Reliance upon questionable intelligence in the war on terrorism is dangerous.

Another clear lesson is that for the Bush administration to credibly lead the global war on terrorism it must divorce itself from the arteriosclerotic hindrance of having to pander to misguided and poorly-informed domestic constituencies. It is a matter of record that the powerful anti-Sudan lobbies within the United States have significantly impeded the effective prosecution of the war on terrorism, both before and after the horrific events of 9/11. Indeed, the horrific events of 11 September 2001 would never have happened had the Clinton Administration accepted the 1996 Sudanese offer to extradite Osama bin-Laden (or repeated offers to assist with counterterrorist afterwards). The administration’s reluctance to do so was clearly heavily influenced not only by flawed policy but also by anti-Sudanese lobbies within Washington which exist to this day.

Footnotes

1 “Roberts Calls US Missile Attack on Sudan Unjustified”, The Wichita Eagle, 28 October 1998. Senator Roberts is a member of both the Senate Intelligence and Armed Forces Committees.
2 Cited in Fenton Bresler, Interpol, Mandarin, London, 1992, p.265.
3 “A Timeworn Terrorism List”, The US News & World Report, 20 May 2002.
4 “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”, United States Capitol, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington-DC, 20 September 2001.
5 President Bill Clinton, “Remarks by the President to the UN General Assembly”, United Nations Headquarters, New York, 22 October 1995.
6 Barton Gellman, “Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign”, Washington Post, 20 December 2001, A01.
7 Ibid.
8 Dr Turabi was subsequently sidelined by the present Sudanese government in 1999, as Khartoum moved towards engagement with the United States. Turabi formed the Popular Congress party as a conservative Islamist opposition to the Khartoum government.
9 Professor Tim Niblock, “Islamist Movements and Sudan’s Political Coherence”, in Herve Bleuchot, Christian Delmet and Derek Hopwood, (Editors), Sudan: History, Identity, Ideologies, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1991, p.265.
10 See, for example, “Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism. Despite Once Harboring Bin Laden, Khartoum Regime Has Supplied Key Intelligence, Officials Say”, The Los Angeles Times, 29 April 2005.
11 “Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism. Despite Once Harboring Bin Laden, Khartoum Regime Has Supplied Key Intelligence, Officials Say”, The Los Angeles Times, 29 April 2005.
12 See, David Rose, “The Secret Bin Laden Files: The Al-Qaeda Intelligence the U.S. Ignored”, Vanity Fair, New York, January 2002, p.50; “Resentful West Spurned Sudan’s Key Terror Files”, The Observer (London), 30 September 2001.
13 The Clinton Administration’s listing of Sudan served clear objectives. Sudan was projected as a state sponsor of terrorism and thereby to a great extent isolated internationally. Listing also brings with it specific sanctions, financial restrictions and prohibitions on economic assistance. These include a ban on arms-related exports and sales and a tight control of “dual-use” goods and technologies. The United States must also oppose any loan from international financial institutions for a country on the terrorism list.
14 Various newspapers and journals have recorded the simple lack of evidence for terrorist support before and after Sudan’s listing. The London Independent newspaper of 9 June 1993, for example, stated: “So far, no major terrorist incident has been traced to the Islamic regime in Sudan. The Sudanese lack the logistical abilities to run terrorist networks...even if they wished.” The London Guardian newspaper of 19 August 1993 reported that: “Independent experts believe...that these reports [of terrorist training camps] have been exaggerated, and that Sudan is too short of money to make it an active sponsor of terrorism.” See also, for example, the observations of The Economist: “Western diplomats admit that they cannot identify a single external act of terrorism – not even the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York…that can be traced back to Khartoum. Nor have they been able to furnish evidence of the training camps in which Iranians and Afghans are allegedly based. Even its partners say that America has not come up with any proof as to why Sudan should be treated as a terrorist pariah”, “Rest Camp for Terrorists: Does Sudan Sponsor Terrorists?”, The Economist, 17 September 1994.
15 “Carter Delights Khartoum”, The Independent, London, 17 September 1993.
16 Donald Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe, Westview Books, Boulder, 1999, p.69.
17 Various newspapers and journals also recorded the simple lack of evidence for terrorist support before and after Sudan’s listing. The London Independent newspaper of 9 June 1993, for example, stated: “So far, no major terrorist incident has been traced to the Islamic regime in Sudan. The Sudanese lack the logistical abilities to run terrorist networks...even if they wished.” The London Guardian newspaper of 19 August 1993 reported that: “Independent experts believe...that these reports [of terrorist training camps] have been exaggerated, and that Sudan is too short of money to make it an active sponsor of terrorism.”
18 Petterson, op.cit., p.69.
19 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1992, United States Department of State, Washington-DC, 1993, p.4.
20 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1993, United States Department of State, Washington-DC, 1994, p.25.
21 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994, United States Department of State, Washington-DC, 1995, p.23.
22 Cited in Fenton Bresler, Interpol, Mandarin, London, 1992, p.265.
23 The State Department’s reports about international terrorism, upon which the listings are based, have also been questioned by American conservative security think-tanks such as the Center for Security Policy. See, for example: “Expert Blasts State Dept. Terror Report as ‘Frankly Fraudulent’”, News Article by World Tribune, 24 May 2002.
24 See, Unproven, Unsustainable and Contradictory: United States Government Allegations of Sudanese Involvement in International Terrorism, The British-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London, 1999, available at www.espac.org
25 ‘The U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Sudan’, Thomson Financial Publishing, www.tfp.com/news/USSudan.htm, 4 November 1997. On 1 July 1998, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (63 Fed. Reg. 35809, July 1, 1998). These regulations blocked all property and interests in property of the Sudanese Government, its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities, including the Bank of Sudan, that were in the United States. They also prohibited: (1) the importation into the United States of any goods or services of Sudanese origin, with the exception of informational material; (2) the exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, or services to Sudan or the Government of Sudan apart from informational materials or donations of humanitarian aid; (3) the involvement of any American person in the export or reexportation of goods and services to or from Sudan; (4) the involvement of any American person in contracts relating to Sudan; (5) the grant or extension of credits or loans by any American person to the Sudanese Government; and (6) transactions relating to the transportation of cargo.
26 See, text of White House statement on 4 November 1997 at www.usis.org.il/publish/press/archive/1997/november/wh31105.htm
27 “A Timeworn Terrorism List”, The US News & World Report, 20 May 2002.
28 “Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism. Despite Once Harboring Bin Laden, Khartoum Regime Has Supplied Key Intelligence, Officials Say”, The Los Angeles Times, 29 April 2005.
29 See “World: U.S. Report Keeps Same Countries on Terror List Despite Overall Decline in Attacks”, News Item by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 3 May 2004.
30 See, for example, offer reported in “Powell to Kenya for Sudan Peace Talks”, News Article by AllAfrica.com, 20 October 2003.
31 See, “Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based Partly on Surmise”, The Washington Post, 21 September 1998; and “Sudan Attack Blamed on US Blunders”, The Times (London), 22 September 1998.
32 The New York Times, 26 March 1993.
33 The New York Times, The Washington Post, 25 June 1993.
34 The New York Times, 18 August 1993.
35 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996 Briefing, Press briefing by Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr, Washington-DC, 30 April 1996 on US Government Home Page, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/960430.html
36 “U.S. Expels Sudanese Diplomat: Diplomat Implicated in U.N. Bomb Plot”, News Article by United States Information Agency, 10 April 1996.
37 “Withdrawal of US Diplomats – Security Council Condemnation”, Keesings Archives, Volume 42, 1996.
38 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 1 February 1996 available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9602/960201db.html
39 “Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise”, The New York Times, 21 September 1999.
40 Extract on Sudan from the Daily Press Briefing, the United States Department of State, 3 March 2000, 12:35 PM.
41 “Dubious Decisions on the Sudan”, Editorial, The New York Times, 23 September 1998.
42 Petterson, op.cit., p.71.
43 Petterson, op.cit., p.91.
44 See, “More Doubts Rise Over Claims for U.S. Attack”, The Wall Street Journal (New York), August 28, 1998; “Sudan to Allow U.N. to Investigate Any Alleged Chemical-Arm Site”, The Wall Street Journal (New York), October 16, 1998; “U.S. Should Admit Its Mistake in Sudan Bombing”, The Wall Street Journal (New York), May 20, 1999.
45 See, “US Unfreezes Assets of Sudan Factory Owner”, Agence France Press, 4 May, 1999, 20:51 GMT; “US Oks Payout for Sudan ‘Mistake’: Faulty Intelligence Blamed for Air Strike”, The Washington Times, 5 May 1999; “US Admits Sudan Bombing Mistake”, The Independent, London, 4 May 1999; “US to Unfreeze Accounts Frozen Over Plant”, The Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 May 1999.
46 “Absent at Conference, Sudan is Still Talking With U.S.”, The Washington Post, 17 March 2000.
47 “Roberts Calls US Missile Attack on Sudan Unjustified”, The Wichita Eagle, 28 October 1998. Senator Roberts is a member of both the Senate Intelligence and Armed Forces Committees.
48 David Rose, “The Secret Bin Laden Files: The Al-Qaeda Intelligence the U.S. Ignored”, Vanity Fair, New York, January 2002, p.50; and “Resentful West Spurned Sudan’s Key Terror Files”, The Observer (London), 30 September 2001.
49 “Sudan Offered Up bin Laden in ‘96”, The Washington Post, 3 October 2001.
50 See, for example, “US Sees Good Progress in Terrorism Talks with Sudan”, News Article by Reuters on 25 September 2001.
51 “Powell Mulls U.N. Action on Sudan After Report African Government is Moving in right Direction on Terrorism”, News Article by Associated Press on 22 August 2001 and “Sudan Provides Intelligence to U.S.”, News Article by Reuters, 29 September 2001.
52 “Foreign Minister says Sudan has been Cooperating with the United States in the Fight against Terrorism for More Than a Year”, New Article by Associated Press on 25 September 2001.
53 See, for example, “US Allows UN Council to End Sanctions Against Sudan”, News Article by Reuters on 28 September 2001; “US Ready to End U.N. Sanctions on Sudan Friday”, News Article by Reuters on 28 September 2001; “US Allows UN Council to End Sanctions Against Sudan”, New Article by Reuters, 28 September 2001.
54 “U.S. Official Accuses Somalia of Harboring Terrorists”, News Article by Xinhua, 12 December 2001.
55 Richard Miniter, Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror, Regnery Publishing, Washington-DC, 2004. A relevant chapter of his book is available online at <http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110005709>
56 Evan Thomas, “The road to September 11”, Newsweek, 1 October 2001.
57 “A Timeworn Terrorism List”, The US News & World Report, 20 May 2002.
58 See, for example, “White House Described Darfur as ‘Genocide’ to Please Christian Right”, The Independent (London), 2 July 2005.
59 “Violence in the Sudan Displaces Nearly 1 Million. An Aid Worker Describes the Gravity of the Humanitarian Crisis”, News Article by MSNBC, 16 April 2004.
60 “Thousands Die as World Defines Genocide”, The Financial Times (London), 6 July 2004. See also, Bradol’s views in “France Calls on Sudan to Forcibly Disarm Darfur Militias”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 July 2004.
61 See, for example, Peter Hallward’s observation in The Guardian: “Bush’s opportunity to adopt an election-season cause that can appeal, simultaneously, to fundamentalist Christians, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, multilateralist liberals and the altruistic ‘left’ may now be too tempting to pass up.” (“Enough Imperial Crusades”, The Guardian, 18 August 2004.)
62 “A Timeworn Terrorism List”, The US News & World Report, 20 May 2002.


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