OBSTRUCTING PEACE AND PROLONGING WAR:
THE REBEL MOVEMENTS IN DARFUR
“There has been a breakdown in negotiations because of unacceptable rebel demands. The talks have been suspended: it’s a
failure.”
Chadian Government Peace Mediator, December 2003 [1]
“The S.L.A. started this war, and now they and Justice and Equality Movement are doing everything possible to keep it going.”
American State Department Official, October 2004 [2] “
The rebels came with preconditions from the start of this meeting, only to
scupper any talks.”
Peace Talks Mediator, January 2005 [3]
“There’s not been any [peace] meeting in a half-year period…we can blame the (rebel) movements for starting yet – for postponing it too long”
Jan Pronk, United Nations Envoy to Sudan, May 2005 [4]
The need to find a peaceful solution to the horrendous war in Darfur is painfully self-evident. The peace
process that has unfolded over the past two years has, however, been a difficult one. The Government of
Sudan has repeatedly declared its commitment to a peaceful solution to the crisis. [5] Most recently, in
January 2005, on the eve of signing the historic peace agreement ending Sudan’s north-south conflict,
President Bashir reiterated his commitment to attaining a settlement of the war in Darfur.[6] This was
echoed by the head of the government’s negotiating team, agriculture minister Dr Majzoub al-Khalifa,
who stated that the government would carry on negotiating until there was a final peace deal. [7] The
government announced in January that Vice-President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, the man who
negotiated an end to the long-running war in the south, would be focusing on the Darfur crisis. [8] Vice-
President Taha has stated that the conflict should be easier to resolve than the north-south war. [9] The war
was not of Khartoum’s making and it is abundantly clear that the Sudanese government has the most to
lose in any continued conflict. Sudan has welcomed the close involvement of both the African Union and
Chad as mediators, and has also agreed and urged the deployment of thousands of African Union peacekeeping
forces. [10] The two rebel movements in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM), however, have repeatedly obstructed the Darfur peace process.
The record is clear. In 2003, the Chadian government offered to mediate between the government and
rebels. The Sudanese government welcomed and has continued to welcome continuing Chadian
mediation in the conflict. [11] The government of Chad was instrumental in negotiating ceasefires in
western Sudan in September 2003 and earlier. On 3 September 2003, as the result of indirect talks hosted
by President Déby, the Sudanese government and rebels signed a six-week ceasefire in Abeche, Chad.
On 17 September, the government and the SLA signed an agreement allowing “free and unimpeded” humanitarian access within Darfur. The government and rebels agreed to a tripartite ceasefire
monitoring commission made up of five members from both sides and five Chadian military officials. In
subsequent Chadian-brokered peace talks, however, the rebels proved to be intransigent. Chadian
Government mediators declared in December 2003, for example, that the rebels had stalled peace talks: “There has been a breakdown in negotiations because of unacceptable rebel demands. The talks have
been suspended: it’s a failure.” [12] Chad’s president called rebel terms for substantive negotiations
“unacceptable”. [13] In what was seen as a deliberate attempt to derail the peace talks, the SLA demanded
military control of the region during a transitional period, 13 percent of all Sudan’s oil earnings and SLA
autonomy in administering Darfur. [14] It was claimed that Islamic fundamentalist opponents of the
Sudanese government aligned to JEM had been instrumental in sabotaging these negotiations. [15]
The April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict On 8 April 2004, in Ndjamena, the Government of Sudan and both rebel movements signed a
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict and a Protocol on the Establishment of
Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur. [16] Under the Ceasefire Agreement, the parties agreed, amongst other
things, to: cease hostilities and proclaim a cease-fire for a period of 45 days automatically renewable,
unless opposed by one of the parties; establish a Joint Commission and a Ceasefire Commission, with the
participation of the international community, including the African Union; free all prisoners of war and
all other persons detained because of the armed conflict in Darfur; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian
assistance and the creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of emergency relief to the displaced
persons and other civilians victims of war, in accordance with the Protocol on the Establishment of
Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur, referred to above. The parties also agreed to: combine their efforts in
order to establish a global and definite peace in Darfur; meet at a later stage within the framework of a
conference of all the representatives of Darfur to agree on a global and definite settlement of the
problems of their region, especially concerning its socio-economic development; contribute to create an
environment conducive to negotiation and stop hostile media campaigns.
Almost immediately, however, SLA spokesmen stated that they would not honour the ceasefire and
would not attend peace talks aimed at establishing the envisaged joint ceasefire monitoring commission.
On 17 April 2004, however, Reuters reported that they had changed their minds and would go after all:
“Rebels from western Sudan said on Friday they would go to peace talks and had not threatened to
withdraw from a ceasefire, adding that previous reports to the contrary were incorrect…Earlier on Friday
SLM/A spokesman Musa Hamid al-Doa said the Justice and Equality Movement JEM) would not go to
the peace talks and would not abide by a ceasefire in effect since Sunday…But Al-Doa later said he had
been given misleading information and another spokesman retracted his comments.” Mohammed
Mursal, a spokesman for the SLA secretary-general stated: “No officially sanctioned statements were
made by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army SLM/A) to imply that we would not abide by the
ceasefire or not go to Addis Ababa or Chad.” Reuters reported that “Analysts say there is infighting in
the SLM/A’s leadership with a power struggle between prominent figures in the armed and political
wings. Mursal said there would be an internal investigation to establish what had led to the confusion.” [17]
The two rebel groups rejected government proposals in early 2004 for round-table conferences on Darfur – despite having agreed on 19 April to attend a peace and development conference in Khartoum for all
Darfur leaders, including the rebels, to be chaired by Idriss Déby, the Chadian president. A 130-strong
preparatory committee were planning for some 1,700 delegates. The JEM leader stated: “We will not
participate in this conference nor do we recognise it.”
In late April 2004 the rebels declared once again they would not participate in the ceasefire talks in
Addis Ababa or the political negotiations in Ndjamena. Reuters reported that Darfur rebels were unlikely
to attend peace talks to end the fighting in Darfur. The SLA had said “it would not attend the political
talks due to reconvene on April 24 in Chad, adding it wanted Eritrea to mediate instead of [Chadian]
President Idriss Debby [sic].” Reuters noted that “Sudan has poor relations with Eritrea”. Reuters also
quoted JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim: “I don’t think we are going to Chad. The Chadian President should
not chair any meeting nor any of his executives.” [18] Even the hitherto rebel-friendly United States warned
the rebels against boycotting the talks aimed at creating a commission to monitor the Darfur ceasefire. A
State Department spokesperson stated: “The United States expects the parties...to actively engage in the
planning and implementation of the ceasefire monitoring team. Failure of any party to fully participate in
this crucial part of the ceasefire agreement is a clear statement of bad faith and will affect our
relationship with them.” [19]
In early May 2004 Chadian peace mediators reported that the government had complained at rebel
violations of the ceasefire, citing government claims that “The rebels are looting and threatening
civilians”. The complaint also accused rebels of livestock rustling, a particularly provocative action in
western Sudan. [20] By late May 2004, the Government stated that there had been 26 rebel violations of the
cease-fire in West Darfur alone. On 24 May the governor of South Darfur state said that there had been
several rebel attacks on villages and civilians. He cited attacks on Abga Rajil village, 50 kilometres south
of the state capital of Nyala: “The outlaws attacked this area, looting and burning down the village, and
when our forces arrived to the area they were already gone.” He also said that on 18 May rebels had also
attacked Labarwa village, about 60 kilometres 40 miles) northeast of Nyala and kidnapped 28 civilians.
He stated that most rebel attacks and violations were along roads from Nyala to other key provincial
towns, particularly Dyeing and Buram to the south: “The outlaws in high-speed cars will attack an area,
and when we arrive they are gone”. [21]
On 22 May 2004, the SLA rejected AU proposals to meet with the government and finalise the formation
of a ceasefire commission, claiming that Ethiopia was too closely aligned to the Sudanese government. [22]
Nevertheless, on 28 May the government and rebels signed an agreement establishing a joint ceasefire
commission along with the modalities for international observers. On 4 June 2004, the African Union
and other international observers finalised an agreement with the government setting out the terms of the
international ceasefire observer mission agreed in the April ceasefire protocol.
In early July 2004, both the SLA and JEM stated that they would not attend further peace talks in Chad.
A SLA leader said: “We do not want Chad to mediate for the political issues because they were not fair
in the humanitarian talks.” [23] The president of the African Union, Alpha Oumar Konare, announced that
the first round of AU-mediated political negotiations between the warring parties to try to end the crisis
were to begin in mid-July in Addis Ababa: “The problem with Darfur is political, its solution is political,
hence the necessity for the parties to quickly begin political negotiations... on July 15 in Addis Ababa.
We hope that all the parties are properly represented”. [24] The Justice and Equality Movement declared,
however, that it would not be joining political negotiations in the Addis Ababa aimed at ending the crisis:
“These negotiations are coming too quickly”. It is worth noting that the United Nations placed on record
a renewal of attacks on humanitarian convoys in Darfur by gunmen from this date onwards. [25] Rebel
attacks on humanitarian aid personnel continued. In the first week of July, the SLA attacked 26 aid
workers, working for Save the Children UK, delivering emergency assistance in northern Darfur. They
also stole six vehicles. On 13 July 2004, the British government urged Sudanese rebels to return the
stolen vehicles. [26] Rebels also attacked a relief convoy near Orishi in North Darfur, murdering nine civilians and several policemen. They also attacked another aid convoy north of al-Fasher, killing four
truck drivers. Rebels also abducted Abass Daw Albeit, the traditional leader of all the tribes of eastern
Darfur. [27]
The second round of African Union-sponsored inter-Sudanese peace talks was held in Abuja, Nigeria,
from 23 August to 17 September 2004. The government declared: “Our concern is to find a quick
peaceful solution to all the unresolved questions.” [28] The Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, hailed
the adoption by both sides of a broad agenda of humanitarian, security and political issues as a “first step
in the right direction”. The negotiations were almost immediately deadlocked when the Darfur rebel
groups backtracked on the previously agreed agenda. Abdel-Wahid Mohamed Ahmed al-Nur, leader of
the Sudan Liberation Army, stated: “We in the movement reject this agenda completely.” The rebels’
move was described by mediators as a “blow to the African Union”. The leader of the Sudanese
government delegation, agriculture minister Majzoub al-Khalifa, reiterated that “We adopted this agenda
in front of President Obasanjo and AU and UN representatives this morning, and we are good to our
word. We are very keen to continue these negotiations.” The Sudanese government also accused the
rebels of several breaches of the existing ceasefire agreement, including an attack in which four
Sudanese humanitarian workers and two journalists were kidnapped. The government spokesman
Ibrahim Mohammed Ibrahim stated: “Despite all that, we will continue to participate in these
negotiations with the same spirit. Hopefully there will be an agreement between us and the rebel
groups.” [29] The agenda, made up of the following items - humanitarian issues, security issues, political
issues and socio-economic issues - was eventually agreed. On day three of the talks, the Sudanese
government agreed to accept a larger African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur if the troops are used
to contain and demobilise rebel forces. The African Union had suggested the supervised cantonment of
rebel and government forces as a step towards a peaceful solution to the crisis. [30] Rebel leaders
subsequently refused to discuss the issue of cantonment. The JEM spokesman stated: “We insist that this
point be taken off the agenda.” [31]
Rebel intransigence was being increasingly noted. The New York Times’s Scott Anderson observed:
“In recent months, the SLA has repeatedly stalled peace talks being brokered by the African Union by
setting unrealistic preconditions or quibbling over such details as where the talks should be held; for its
part the Justice and Equality Movement faction had, until recently, boycotted the talks altogether.”
Anderson cited an American diplomat: “The first notion anyone’s got to disabuse themselves of is that
there are any good guys in this. There aren’t. The S.L.A. started this war, and now they and Justice and
Equality Movement are doing everything possible to keep it going.” [32]
The talks nevertheless ended with the agreeing of a Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian
Situation in Darfur which addressed the issue of free movement and access for humanitarian workers and
assistance as well as the protection of civilians. In the lead-up to the next rounds of talks, however, the
rebels intensified their attacks in Darfur, attacks which severely impeded the delivery of emergency aid
to Darfur. In October 2004, the UN confirmed rebel responsibility for attacks in Darfur, quoting the
UN’s Envoy to Sudan: “Mr Pronk said rebel groups – the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) – were responsible for much of the recent violence, which is restricting
humanitarian access to many areas within Darfur, a vast and desolate region in western Sudan.” [33]
The third round of African Union-mediated Darfur peace talks was held in Abuja from 21 October to 9
November 2004. Despite the urgent and immediate ongoing humanitarian crisis, the rebels refused to
discuss humanitarian issues. A JEM leader said: “The government is insisting on discussing the humanitarian issue. It only wants to waste time and avoid the real issue on ground.” [34] The rebels also
stalled the peace talks because of the African Union’s seating plans, stating they did not wish to sit near
the government negotiators. Abubakar Hamid, the coordinator of the joint JEM/SLA team, declared:
“We are not going to participate…because they are trying to force us to sit with government delegates.” [35]
He added: “We’d rather the African Union appoints two separate teams to negotiate with the two
groups.” [36]
When the rebels returned to the negotiations, having agreed to sit with the government, they then
continued to refuse to sign a humanitarian aid agreement essential for the provision of relief to those
affected by the war. A European diplomat said: “We’ve told the rebels that for them to be seen as
blocking the signature of the humanitarian protocol is not very good…The rebels should not take the
international community for granted. They think they have all the international sympathies, but if they
are seen as the ones who are stalling they will have to pay a price.” [37] The second round of AU-sponsored
talks had focused on the humanitarian crisis but the rebels refused to sign new humanitarian
arrangements. JEM’s Haroun Abdulhameed said that the rebels would focus only on power-sharing: “We
are not going to harp on humanitarian issues. There is no need for that…The government in insisting on
discussing the humanitarian issue only wants to waste time…” The Sudan Liberation Army spokesman
stated: “We must tackle the political issue above everything if we are to make any progress…” [38]
After considerable time invested in mediation, this round of talks resulted in the signing of a Protocol on
the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur and the signing of the Protocol on the Improvement
of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, as discussed and agreed at the previous round of talks on 9
November 2004. The government and rebels agreed to renew a cessation of hostilities and, for the first
time, the government agreed to renounce “hostile” military flights over Darfur, except in cases of selfdefence.
[39] The two sides had also initiated discussion on a draft Declaration of Principles which would
constitute the basis for a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the conflict. [40]
In early November 2004, in an official report, the UN Envoy to Sudan pointed to deliberate attempts by
the rebel movement to provoke government responses: “Some commanders provoke their adversaries by
stealing, hijacking and killing”. [41]
The SLA’s November 2004 Violation of the Peace Accords
Despite having signed the Abuja ceasefire protocols on 9 November, less than two weeks later the SLA
mounted several systematic attacks on police and civilians in Darfur. The African Union noted that “in
late November, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army SLM/A) carried out attacks on various places,
including Tawila, in North Darfur, Adwah village, in South Darfur, the town of Um-Asal and at Draida.
These attacks constitute serious and unacceptable violations of the…N’djamena Agreement and the
Abuja Protocols.” [42] International criticism of these attacks was universal, immediate and unambiguous.
The UN Envoy to Sudan Jan Pronk stated that the SLA was solely responsible for breaching the ceasefire
and restarting the fighting in north Darfur: “This was a unilateral violation of the agreement by SLA, not
by the government.” [43] He declared that: “I do really think that the international community should hold
them SLA) accountable for not complying with international agreements and their own promises.” [44]
In early December 2004, the SLA admitted to kidnappings, attacks on civilians and obstructing aid workers. The organisation promised there would be no more incidents. [45] On 5 December 2004, the Sudanese government released documents which it said showed that the rebels had killed 89 people in more than 300 armed robberies since the April 2004 ceasefire. A Sudanese interior minister stated that the number of armed robberies in Darfur in eight months following the ceasefire was higher than in the previous 15 months. The documents indicated that from 1 January 2003 to April 2004 there were 251 armed robberies in which 80 people had been murdered. From April until the end of November there were 320 armed robberies during which 89 people were killed. [46]
In early December 2004, Sudan’s Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, Mohamed Yusif Abdallah, reaffirmed Khartoum’s desire for a negotiated settlement to the crisis, stating that a settlement for Darfur could be part of a broader constitutional reform also affected other regions: “The southern peace agreement will have a positive impact on Darfur. By induction we expect to sign the agreement in Darfur in the next two months…I hope the situation becomes like the south where the rebels commit themselves seriously to a ceasefire.” [47] The first week of December, however, saw continuing rebel attacks which forced the withdrawal of more aid workers from Darfur. Attacks, for example, on Saraf Ayat in north Darfur, had resulted in Médecins Sans Frontières evacuating its staff and the displacement of 2,000 civilians. Some 4,500 people were affected by this attack and others. [48]
In December the SLA, and its obstruction of the peace process, came under close scrutiny by The New York Times. The newspaper reported that: “The SLA has been accused of stalling at the last round of African Union-mediated peace talks in Abuja. Despite promises, it has yet to disclose the location of its fighters, on security grounds. Privately, some aid workers and diplomats accuse the SLA of sowing the seeds of further conflict by acts of provocation.”
The New York Times gave an example of such provocation: “For instance, the rebel group has blocked the seasonal migration routes of a large and powerful nomadic Arab tribe just south of [Thabit]. To date, the leaders of the tribe have remained neutral in the Darfur conflict, but blocking the movement of their animals and thus threatening their livelihood and their way of life could be disastrous.” The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as saying that the rebels were “broadening the conflict base. The SLA knows what they are doing.” [49]
Under pressure from the international community, the rebels came back to the peace table. The fourth round of African Union-mediated Darfur peace talks was held in Abuja from 11 to 21 December 2004. Reuters reported that the government indicated its wish to reach a peace deal in the African Union talks which had recommenced in Abuja. Majzoub al-Khalifa, head of Sudan’s delegation said there was “a lot of common ground for agreement”. He said: “We are very much hoping to come to a final peace agreement in this round” adding that the government would do its best to reach an agreement “before the end of this year so that peace in Sudan will be finalised by January in all parts of Sudan”. JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim dismissed the meeting, declaring “[t]his is not a serious round of talks” and that JEM had lost faith in African Union sponsorship of Darfur peace efforts. [50] News agencies reported in mid-December that the rebels had pulled out of the Abuja peace talks. [51] This also coincided with new rebel attacks aimed at disrupting peace process. The African Union confirmed as much. [52] The African Union’s chief mediator, Sam Ibok, said that all the international representatives at the talks had advised against the walk-out because “there was no justification for such a suspension.” The Sudanese government commented that: “Only negotiation and talks will solve the problem of Darfur. Withdrawal from the talks means more trouble for Darfur.” [53]
The rebels returned to the AU-mediated talks and progress appeared to have been made during these negotiations. The government agreed to withdraw its forces from positions it had moved into following the rebels’ November offensive in Tawila and elsewhere. [54] And while the rebels rejected new proposals for peace [55] , they promised no more attacks and violations of the ceasefire agreements. [56] The SLA and JEM committed themselves “to cease all attacks against humanitarian and commercial activities and to restrain their forces from attacks on government infrastructure, including police posts”. [57] The rebels broke their word within days with two serious attacks. On 27 December, rebel forces attacked the town of Ghubaysh. The United Nations said that “notably” this was “the second attack by the SLA since 19 December when the Government of Sudan agreed to an immediate cessation of hostilities.” [58]
In late December Reuters reported that JEM had refused any continuing African Union mediation in the Darfur conflict, citing a rebel spokesman: “JEM is rejecting the African Union, We are not going to Abuja again under the auspices of the African Union.” [59] This was a particular blow to the peace process as the future rounds of peace talks were to focus on the political solution to the Darfur conflict. The government had already announced a range of proposals focusing on a federal solution to the problem. [60]
The Sudanese government showed its frustration at the unwillingness of the Darfur rebels to seriously commit to the peace talks: “At the last round in Abuja where the vital political issues was to be discussed, [the] government came ready with six ministers. That shows we were here for business. But the rebels had a different agenda. They delegated very junior officers who could not agree on anything. It is no wonder that [they] keep frustrating the talks via incessant walkouts.” [61]
In early 2005, the rebels announced that they would be leaving the ceasefire commission in Darfur. Reuters reported that the UN had said “a rebel threat to withdraw from a cease-fire monitoring commission in Sudan’s troubled Darfur region would spell disaster for the faltering peace process”. A UN spokesperson warned: “Obviously, if the SLA make this threat a matter of fact…that would be a disastrous thing to happen because we do not believe that any of the parties have any interest in destroying the little fragile gains they have made.” [62] Reuters reported that officials at the January 2005 cease-fire talks “blamed the rebels for the meeting’s failure”. A peace mediator stated: “The rebels came with preconditions from the start of this meeting, only to scupper any talks.” [63] The rebels subsequently suspended their participation in the ceasefire committee and rebel attacks continued. [64]
This intransigence continued well into 2005. Speaking in late May 2005 United Nations Special Envoy to Sudan, Jan Pronk observed: “There’s not been any [peace] meeting in a half-year period…we can blame the (rebel) movements for starting yet – for postponing it too long” [65]
Footnotes
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