DARFUR IN PERSPECTIVE
By Professor David Hoile
Published by The European - Sudanese Public Affairs Council
Chapter 1
THE CAUSES OF THE DARFUR
CRISIS
The
conflict in Darfur has nothing to do with marginalisation or
the inequitable distribution of wealth. Inherently it is a struggle
between the two factions of the Sudanese Islamist movement, the
(opposition)
Popular Congress party and the ruling National Congress (party).
Sudanese Human Rights Activist Ghazi Suleiman
[18]
The war in Darfur which began in February 2003
was markedly different from the conflicts
which had hitherto been fought in the region
Two armed roups, he Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and
the Sudan Liberation Army LA), launched
attacks on policemen, government garrisons
and civilians in the area. [19] The first attack was on
Gulu, the capital of the Jebel Marra region of central Darfur.
There
were a number of other systematic and well-organised
attacks, most notably on al-Fasher and Mellit,
respectively the capital and the second largest
city in North Darfur. The attack on al-Fasher was by undreds
of
rebels, and there were significant military
and civilian casualties. The rebel forces
are said to be “well-equipped”. [20] The SLA
was reported by Agence France Presse to have “modern
satellite communications”. [21]
UN media sources have also noted claims by
tribal leaders that the rebels have better
weapons than the Sudanese army. [22] The rebels have also been
receiving military supplies by air. [23] The fighters, led bycommanders
with satellite telephones, are well-armed with rocketpropelled grenades,
heavy machine-guns, mortars and automatic rifles, and
transported in fleets of all-terrain vehicles – mainly
Toyota “
technicals” with mounted heavy machines guns, an infamous
hallmark of the Somalian conflict. The rebels
have killed over 685 policemen, wounded 500
others and attacked and destroyed over 80 police
stations. [24]
In response to these attacks, government forces launched offensives against
the SLA. These resulted in the death of the SLA military commander,
Abdallah Abakkar, and the recovery of most of the areas previously
held by the rebels. The rebel groups appear to have recruited from
within two or three “African”, sedentary,
communities such as the Fur and the Zaghawa
tribes, and these areas bore the brunt of much of the fighting.
In perhaps the most objective
reading of the present crisis in Darfur, the UN
media service has made this analysis: “The conflict
pits farming communities against nomads
who have aligned themselves with the militia
groups – for whom the raids are a way of life – in
stiff competition for land and resources.
The militias, known as the Janjaweed,
attack in large numbers on horseback and camels and are driving
the farmers from their land, often pushing them towards
town centres.” [25]
The violence in Darfur has
taken on several forms. The government has used
its army and air force in its response to the rebellion. It has
also drawn on local “popular defence
forces”, made up
of national and local volunteers.
And it has also recruited from amongst politically supportive local
tribes to form additional irregular forces. It is also
clear that a variety of armed groups
have been active in Darfur over the past year or so,
either as participants in the war or taking advantage
of the turmoil the conflict has caused. The systematic
murder by rebels of several hundred
policemen and the destruction of over 80 police stations
created a security vacuum. The
rebels’ targeting of tribal
leaders and tribesmen
from several “Arab” tribes, and the theft
of thousands of head of livestock
from these tribes, has resulted in an explosion of intercommunal violence
with revenge attacks and livestock raids by equally well-armed
nomadic tribes. [26] Darfur has also historically had a
serious problem with armed banditry,
the so-called “Janjaweed” phenomena, and
heavily armed criminal gangs from both sides of the Chad-Sudan border have added to the chaos.
A disjointed peace process
saw several short ceasefires in the course of
2003. On 19 April 2004, however, the government and
rebels signed a significant
humanitarian ceasefire agreement mediated by the Chadian government
as a first step towards a lasting peace. In November
2004 African Union (AU) mediation
resulted in the government and rebel movements
signing the Abuja protocols, extending the ceasefire
and aid access agreements. [27]
The African Union will be providing both a forum for
continuing peace talks and ceasefire supervision. It
is essential that agreements
are honoured, monitored and followed through as the international
community attempts both to address the humanitarian
aid needs of those hundreds
of thousands of civilians who have been displaced
by the war and to facilitate a political solution to
the conflict. While the ceasefire
has been violated from time to time by all parties
to the conflict, the bulk of
events now in focus happened before the April ceasefire.
What Has Caused the Unrest?
It is essential for anyone intent
on bringing the Darfur conflict to an end to
examine closely the causes of the violence that has
convulsed the region. The
insurgents claim to be acting because of Darfur’s marginalisation
and underdevelopment. That Darfur is underdeveloped is
self-evident. It is no more underdeveloped, however,
than several other parts of
Sudan. It is also clear that this historic underdevelopment –
however it is measured – does not adequately
explain the intercommunal violence
in past decades. It is difficult to accept that underdevelopment
and marginalisation accounts for the level of focused and
orchestrated violence aimed at the Government of Sudan
since early 2003, and clearly
planned for some considerable time beforehand.
It
is difficult, for example, to ignore Khartoum’s
assertions with regard to
development in Darfur since the present government
came to power in 1989. The
government has stated that, before 1989, there were
only 16 high schools in Darfur:
there are presently some 250 schools; the number
of primary schools had increased from 241 in 1986 to
786 in 2003. In 1989 there
were 27,000 students in schools; in 2003 there were more
than 440,000. In 1989 there was not a single university
in Darfur; there are now three.
The number of hospitals in Darfur has increased under
this government from three hospitals in 1988 to 23
hospitals by 2001; health
centres had increased from 20 to 44 in the same period. Water
pump production in greater Darfur has also increased
from 1,200,000 cubic metres
in 1989 to 3,100,000 cubic metres in 2003. During
2000-2003, the following water projects were implemented
in greater Darfur: the installation
of 110 deep ground wells, the rehabilitation
of 133 ground wells, the building of 43 dykes and 30 dams,
the drilling of 842 hand pumps and the rehabilitation
of 839 hand pump wells. The
total power generation in greater Darfur has risen
under this government from
2,300 kilowatts in 1989 to 4,500 kw by 2000. Before
1989 there was not a single airport in Darfur; there
are now three, in al-Fasher,
Nyala and al-Geneina, along with three aerodromes at
al- Deain, Zallingi and Jama – this
represents 40 per cent of airports outside of
the national capital. There has been a three-fold increase
in paved roads since 1989.
And, politically, Darfur is very well represented at
all levels of Sudanese society.
There are eight government ministers from Darfur and
four Darfurian state governors. [28] Darfurians are also members
of the supreme and constitutional court. Darfurian representation
in the National Assembly is second only to the southern states. [29]
The Sudanese
government has also made the point that, far from showing
interest in development issues for Darfur, rebels have repeatedly
attacked key education and development projects and civilians
involved in these projects. In April 2003, rebels murdered Engineer
Ahmed Youssef Mahdi, the director of the Jebel Marra agricultural
scheme. On 21 November 2003, for example, rebels murdered
al-Tayeb Abdul Gadir al-Nour, a telephone engineer,
while he was inspecting the
fibreglass cable line linking Nyala and al-Geneina. On
27 November they murdered three water engineers working
on rural water schemes. In
March 2003 rebels attacked the school examination centre in Tina and stole the examination papers. This
led to the abandoning of certain school examinations nationally,
adversely affecting tens of
thousands of school students and their families. [30]
Rebel
attacks on development projects continued into 2004.
In June 2004, for example,
rebel attacks stopped work on an emergency water supply
project for al-Fasher. [31] Their attacks on development
and infrastructure projects
have been criticised by several Darfurian community
leaders. The chairman of trade unions in North Darfur, Alamir
Altagani Ali Dinar, stated that it was “strange” that
the rebels attacked the development
projects in the state, while claiming lack of development
as the cause of their movement. The general secretary
of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Mohammed Nour Ahmed,
said that the attacks delay
development projects in Darfur. [32] What
is becoming increasingly obvious is that whatever legitimate issues
may have arisen out of concerns about underdevelopment
they have been hijacked by
various opportunistic forces to serve different ends.
The question that must be answered is what was it that
turned limited, low-intensity
conflicts between the pastoral and arable farming groups
in Darfur into a well-organised, well-armed and well-resourced
civil war? Rebel claims that the war is simply the
inevitable result of marginalisation
have been contradicted by reputable, independent observers.
A particularly credible observer is Ghazi Suleiman,
Sudan’s most prominent
human rights activist. He has been described by Reuters as “a
prominent non-partisan political figure” [33]
and by the Knight- Ridder
news service as a “well-known Sudanese
human rights lawyer. [34] Suleiman
has publicly stated: “The conflict in
Darfur has nothing to do with
marginalisation or the inequitable distribution of
wealth. Inherently it is a
struggle between the two factions of the Sudanese Islamist movement,
the (opposition) Popular Congress party and the ruling National Congress (party).” [35]
One of the
few recognised experts on Sudan, albiet it from a clearly
antigovernment perspective,
is Dr Alex de Waal. [36] Described by The Observer
newspaper of London as a “world authority
on the country”, de
Waal is a human rights advocate who has published widely
on Sudan.He as also previously worked in Darfur.
De Waal has also made interesting
points about the marginalisation issue. He has noted,
for example, that the black
Arabs of Darfur are “among
the most disadvantaged of
all Darfur’s communities”. [37]
The Zaghawa community, on
the other hand, has established itself commercially
in Darfur and other parts
of Sudan. De Waal has noted: “They
cannot simply be described—as
they often are—as “nomads” or “farmers”:
they are both, and more besides.
For sheer business acumen, the Zaghawa surpassed all contenders
in Darfur, making spare but impressive profits in an economy
that seemed to have no surplus.” In addition,
the Zaghawa are the ruling élite
in Chad – Chadian President
Idriss Déby, and many of the
ministers around him, are Zaghawa. [38] It is also the
case that the rebels cannot
in any case claim the full support even of their own communities.
In April 2004, for example, SLA rebels kidnapped and murdered
Abdel Rahman Mohammain, a prominent Zaghawa tribal leader,
because of his opposition to them. The UN stated that
this murder was “aimed at intimidating and deterring” local
leaders in Darfur. [39]
Claims of Fur marginalisation are
also very questionable. Douglas Johnston
has also shown that at the time of many of the pre-2003 conflicts
between pastoralists – Arab and African,
such as the Zaghawa–
and farmers, far from being marginalised it was the
Fur who dominated government
structures in Darfur: “With
the upper levels of the regional
government being occupied by Fur, the broader structural changes
of regionalization from 1981 onwards led to a sharpening
of partisan politics in the
approach to pastoralist/non-pastoralist confrontations.” [40]
Even Sharif Harir, a long-time critic of Khartoum and himself
now closely identified with the Sudan Liberation Army,
has noted that the appointment
in 1981 of the Fur politician Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige
as Governor of Darfur saw a Fur political ascendancy
in the region. He also noted that Fur hegemony resulted
in the crystallisation of
two political alliances – with the Fur and
elements of urban Darfurian elites
on one hand, and the Zaghawa, nomadic Arab groups and
the Islamist extremists on
the other. [41] Harir even went so far as to state that “
a deep hostility began to develop between the persecuted
groups and the Fur-led government.”
While citing
marginalisation, it is clear that those sections of
the Zaghawa, Fur and other
tribes, who are at the forefront of the rebellion in
Darfur have themselves in large part dominated political
and economic life in Darfur.
Their motivations continue to be influenced by political
ambition and, in the case of elements of the Zaghawa,
by a continuing allegiance to Islamist politics and Dr Hasan
Turabi.
The Islamist
Roots of the Darfur Conflict For
all the claims of marginalisation, there is no doubt
whatsoever that the conflict
within the Sudanese Islamist movement following the government’s
sidelining of the Islamist eminence grise Dr Hasan
Turabi in 1999 is central
to the Darfur conflict. Once the mentor of the present government,
Dr Turabi had long been seen by reformists within Sudan as
an obstacle both to the normalisation of relations
with the United States and
a peace agreement with southern rebels. The ruling
National Congress party, al-Mutamar
al-Wattani, split in 2000/2001 with hardliners under
Turabi, many of them from Darfur, forming the Popular Congress
party, al-Mutamar al-Sha’bi, in opposition
to any engagement with Washington
and the West and peace in southern Sudan. (De Waal has
observed: “It is almost unbearably ironic
that just as southern Sudan is
on the brink of peace, Darfur – and with it
the entire north – is convulsed by another war. The linkage is not accidental” [42]. Sudarsan Raghavan, the Africa bureau chief for Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
a veteran commentator on Darfur and critic of the government,
has reported on the Islamist twist to the Darfur issue: “The violence
in Sudan’s western province of Darfur…is
widely portrayed as an ethnic-cleansing
campaign by Arab militias against black African villagers.
But it’s also part of a long-running
fight for political supremacy
between Sudanese president Omar al Bashir and an Islamist who
called Osama bin Laden a hero. [Emphasis added] For
15 years, Hassan Turabi was
Sudan’s most powerful man,
deftly manoeuvring its leaders
from his perch as speaker of the parliament. He counted
bin Laden among his close
friends and once called the United States ‘the incarnation
of the devil’.” Turabi has
subsequently been very critical of Khartoum
for “selling out” to Washington,
including Sudan’s considerable
assistance in the war on terrorism and concessions Khartoum
has made in the peace process. Raghavan
asserts that “the government is deathly
afraid of Turabi” and has
noted: “many Sudanese believe…Turabi’s
supporters are the core of the
rebel groups”. [43] He also cites Ghazi Suleiman,
whom he described as a “well-known
Sudanese human rights lawyer”,
as saying of the war in Darfur: “It
is a struggle to seize power in Khartoum, and the battlefield is
in Darfur.” [44] In a different interview, with
Reuters, Ghazi Suleiman stated
that “Turabi is the mastermind of the
existing conflict in Darfur. If he
is released and if the government tries to come to
an agreement with him he will
stop what is going on in Darfur in a week.” [45]
This line of analysis has
also been confirmed by other anti-government commentators.
Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, the general-secretary of
the Pan African Movement and
co-director of Justice Africa, a human rights organisation,
has also said: “Darfur is a victim
of the split within the National
Islamic Front personified by…Dr Hassan
al-Turabi and his former protégé, General Omar al-Bashir.
Al-Turabi’s support is very strong in Darfur…” [46]
The Justice and Equality Movement,
at the heart of the Darfur conflict, is
led by Turabi protégé Dr Khalil Ibrahim.
Formed in November 2002, it
is increasingly recognised as being part and parcel
of the Popular Congress. Time
magazine has described JEM as “a
fiercely Islamic organisation
said to be led by Hassan al-Turabi” and
that Turabi’s ultimate
goal is “the presidential palace in
Khartoum and a stridently Islamic
Sudan”. [47] Khalil is a long-time associate
of Turabi’s and served as
a state minister in Darfur in the early 1990s before
serving as a state cabinet-level
advisor in southern Sudan. Ibrahim was a senior member of
the Islamist movement’s secret military wing.
The International Crisis Group
has noted that “Khalil Ibrahim…is
a veteran Islamist and former state
minister who sided with the breakaway [Popular Congress]
in 2002 and went into exile
in the Netherlands.” [48] He
was closely involved in raising
several brigades of the Popular Defence Force (PDF)
and mujahideen, many of them
personally recruited from Darfur tribes, to fight
rebels in southern Sudan. He was known as the emir
of the mujahideen. Ibrahim
recruited several hundred JEM fighters from the ranks
of those Darfurian tribesmen he had led in the south,
claiming that the Khartoum
government had sold out to the southern rebels and Washington.
De Waal has mentioned that the student wing and regional
Islamist ce ls
followed Turabi into opposition following the split.
Two other parts of the Islamist
infrastructure that joined Turabi virtually en masse following
the break were the financial cell and the military
wing (which continued to exist
separately of the Sudanese armed forces even after
the 1989 coup which brought
the present government to power, and which had
previously administered the PDF and jihad fighters).
Both had always been strictly
controlled by Turabi. This military wing formed the core
of JEM and the military structures which planned and
initiated attacks in Darfur.
In November 2003, the Popular Congress admitted that
some party members were involved in the Darfur conflict. [49]
InJanuary 2004 Turabi admitted supporting the Darfur
insurrection: “We support
the cause, no doubt about it…we have relations
with some of the leadership.” [50]
In the same month, Turabi admitted that 30 members of his
Popular Congress party had been arrested in connection
with activities in Darfur. [51]
The influential
Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram was also explicit in its linking
of JEM to extremist Islamism: “JEM is a
militant Islamist organisation
reputedly linked to the Popular National Congress Party (PNC)
of the Sudanese Islamist ideologue and former speaker
of the Sudanese parliament Hassan
Al-Turabi.” [52] Al-Ahram
has also noted Turabi’s
involvement in Darfur: “Al-Turabi
wields powerful influence among
certain segments of Darfur society. Darfur, a traditional
Islamist stronghold…The
Sudanese government is especially concerned about the
involvement of elements sympathetic to Al-Turabi in the
Darfur conflict.” [53]
The International
Crisis Group has also noted the Darfur war’s
Islamist origins: “Darfur’s
crisis is also rooted in the disputes that have plagued Sudan’s
Islamist movement since it took power in 1989. Following
a disagreement with Hassan el-Turabi,
the architect and spiritual guide of the
Islamist movement, a second split in the ruling Islamist
movement had an equally destabilising
impact on Darfur. In 2000, Turabi, then speaker
of parliament, formed the Popular National Congress (later renamed
the Popular Congress, PC) following a fierce power struggle with
the ruling National Congress Party. To broaden its base,
PC activists reached out to Sudan’s
majority but marginalised African population.” [54]
These roots have also been commented upon by human rights
activists: “The
second rebel group is the Justice and EqualityMovement
(JEM), based mostly on the Zaghawa tribe. It is linked
with the radical Popular Patriotic
Congress party led by the veteran Islamist Hassan
al-Turabi who has now fallen out with his former NIF disciples…The
relationship between JEM and SLM remains one of the obscure
points of the Darfur conflict, even if the two organizations
claim to be collaborating militarily.
The JEM is by far the richer of the two and
the one with the greater international media exposure,
even if its radical Islamist connections
make it an unlikely candidate for fighting a radical
Islamist government…The main financial
support for the uprising comes… in
the case of the JEM, from foreign funds under the control
of Hassan al-Turabi. It is the importance of this last
financial source that explains
the fairly impressive and modern equipment of the rebel forces.” [55] De Waal has also written about the split between the
Islamists and the Khartoum government: “It
was a protracted struggle, over ideology, foreign
policy, the constitution and ultimately power itself.
Bashir won: in 1999 he dismissed
Turabi from his post as speaker of the National Assembly,
and later had him arrested. The Islamist coalition was
split down the middle…The
students and the regional Islamist party cells went
into opposition with Turabi, forming the breakaway Popular Congress.
Among other things, the dismissal of Turabi gave Bashir
the cover he needed to approach
the United States, and to engage in a more serious
peace process with the SPLA – a process
that led to the signing of the
peace agreement in Kenya.” [56]
The International Crisis Group has
noted that “the
alleged link between JEM (Justice
and Equality Movement) and the [Popular Congress] is
the most worrisome for [Khartoum],
since it fears Turabi is using Darfur as a
tool for returning to power in Khartoum at the expense
of his former partners in the
ruling National Congress Party (NCP).” [57]
It has also further noted that “The
belief that the Darfur rebellion has been hijacked by
disaffected rival Islamists is a main reason behind the
government’s refusal to
talk to the rebels, particularly JEM. The personal rivalry between
Vice-President Taha and his ex-mentor Turabi for control
of the Islamist movement and the
country is being played out in Darfur, with civilians
as the main victims.” [58] Dr Richard Cornwell,
the Sudan expert at the South
African-based Institute of Security Studies, has said
that many Sudanese believe that
JEM was formed as result of the power struggle
between President Bashir and Hasan Turabi: “The
Turabi link is very important…there
are some people who are of the opinion that Turabi’s
supporters in Khartoum and Darfur deliberately manufactured this
crisis with a view of taking power.” [59] Agence
France Presse has concluded that “disgraced
Turabi loyalists of Muslim African origin…constitute
the core of the JEM’s current
leadership…More than a liberation
movement, the JEM is seen as an organisation used as
a tool by members of the political
opposition to destabilise Beshir’s regime.” [60]
The
Government of Sudan was initially very reluctant to concede
that Dr Turabi and the Popular
Congress were intimately involved in the Darfur conflict.
In May 2004, however, Sudanese Interior Minister Major- General
Abdul-Rahim Mohammed Hussein admitted as much: “The Popular
Congress is involved in the incidences in Darfur and
the JEM is just another face of
the Popular Congress.” [61] In
September 2004, the Governor of
West Darfur, Suleiman Abdullah Adam, stated that the Justice
and Equality Movement was the military wing of the Popular Congress: “The
JEM are the military wing of the Popular Congress and, as
the military wing of the Popular Congress in Darfur,
they try to escalate the situation.” [62]
It is also
becoming apparent that the Popular Congress has been
using a dual – interconnected – strategy
in its attempts to overthrow the Khartoum government.
They have used orchestrated events in Darfur to weaken
the government domestically and internationally – perhaps
even to the extent of foreign
military intervention. And they have also attempted,
in combination, to mount a military uprising. In March
2004, military officers linked
to the Popular Congress attempted a coup d’état in
Khartoum. The BBC said: “Those detained are
also being linked to the uprising
in the Darfur region.” [63] They also
planned attacks on oil refineries
and power stations. [64] In September 2004 the government
also foiled another Popular
Congress coup attempt. [65] The Islamist plotters were
accused of plotting to assassinate or kidnap government
officials and take over strategic
installations, including state radio and television. [66]
The government captured a large arms cache “with
which the conspirators planned
to kidnap and kill 38 government officials and destroy
strategic targets in Khartoum”. [67] The
trials of those involved in the
coup attempts, including five retired members of the
armed forces and a former
cabinet minister began in late 2004. [68] They were charged with
possessing weapons, terrorism, undermining the constitutional system
and plotting war. Twenty-one serving members of the
armed forces were charged
separately. [69] The Sudanese government began to move against Islamist extremists. [70]
It is clear
that Turabi and Popular Congress deliberately chose
Darfur to be the cockpit of
their war against Khartoum. They also cold-bloodedly
sought to project a racial element on the issue. Popular
Congress activists originated
and distributed a publication known as “The Black Book” alleging
Khartoum’s marginalisation
and neglect of Darfur and claiming
that Sudan’s political elite was dominated
by a northern Arab clique – seemingly
the same clique once led by Dr Turabi. The Financial
Times confirmed that the “Black Book” had
been written by Justice and
Equality Movement activists. The newspaper also noted
that “
The appearance of the Black Book did coincide with
a deep split in the regime,
which has exacerbated tension in society.” [71]
Alex de Waal has also commented
on the importance of the “Black
Book” in subsequent events
in Darfur: “The Islamist split quickly
took on regional and ethnic dimensions.
The west Africans and Darfurians who had come into
the Islamist movement under
Turabi’s leadership left
with him…In May 2000,
Darfurian Islamists produced the “Black
Book”…The Black Book was
a key step in the polarization of the country along
politically constructed ‘racial’ rather
than religious lines, and it laid the basis for a coalition
between Darfur's radicals, who formed the SLA, and
its Islamists, who formed
the other rebel organization, the Justice and Equality Movement.” [72]
Charles
Snyder, a former United States Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs,
and the State Department’s
senior adviser on Sudan, has
noted the visceral nature of the intra-Islamist struggle: “The emergence
of armed opposition in Darfur has profoundly shaken
the government because it
poses, in many respects, a greater threat than the activities
of the SPLM in the south….Support
for the JEM and SLM, however,
comes from within the overwhelmingly Muslim population
of Darfur; radical Muslim
cleric Turabi, who was recently jailed by the current
[government of Sudan], has links to the JEM. Moreover,
over 50 percent of the Sudanese
military is from Darfur, and that region is not far
from Khartoum. A successful insurgency in Darfur would
fuel potential insurgencies in other parts of the north.
This, I believe, explains why the Government of Sudan has adopted such
brutal tactics in Darfur. The GOS is determined to
defeat the JEM and SLM at any cost…” [73]
The linkage
between Darfur’s violence and the
Popular Congress has an additional
dimension. In February 2001, Turabi and the Popular Congress
signed a joint memorandum with the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army SPLA), the southern rebel movement led by Dr
John Garang, which called
for the “the escalation
of popular resistance” against
Khartoum. A secret codicil to the Popular Congress/SPLA memorandum
was an agreement by the SPLA to train Darfur rebels.
The International Crisis Group,
an organisation very critical of the Sudanese government,
has noted that “numerous sources
link the SPLA to the beginning
of the SLA rebellion by providing arms, training, and strategy…It
allegedly trained as many as 1,500 Darfurians near
Raja, in western Bahr el-Ghazal,
in March 2002.” [74] These
trainees subsequently formed
the basis of the Sudan Liberation Army and Justice
and Equality Movement. The
SPLA have clearly maintained their relationship with
the Dr Turabi and the Popular Congress, demanding that
Turabi be invited to the January
2005 signing of the north-south
peace agreement. [75]
In October 2004,
the Sudanese government warned that a new armed
movement with links to Dr Turabi had emerged in the
central
Kordofan region of Sudan.
Called Shahama, this group was headed by Mussa Ali
Mohammedin, another member of the Popular Congress.
It was said
to operate from bases in
Bahr
al-Ghazal. [76]
The intimate
involvement of Islamist extremists such as Dr Turabi
and his Popular Congress
party in the Darfur insurgency has worrying implications
for those eager to end and resolve the war. It is very difficult,
for example, to end a conflict said to be about marginalisation and
underdevelopment when at least one of major participants
would appear to have a
hidden agenda of overthrowing the Government of Sudan
and replacing it with a more hard-line Islamist regime.
Building schools and roads
and drilling more water wells in Darfur, while doubtlessly
useful, is not going to satisfy hard-line Islamist
rebels in Darfur any more
than reconstruction projects in Iraq have satisfied Islamist
insurgents in that country.
External
Involvement in the Darfur Conflict
It
is additionally clear that the Darfur insurgents
have had considerable external
assistance. The Sudan Liberation Army, for example,
is said to be receiving
arms and support from Eritrea. [77] The Justice and
Equality Movement is said
to be receiving assistance from Islamist groups and
al- Qaeda. [78] The Sudan
Liberation Army was reported by Agence France Presse
to have “weapons, vehicles and modern
satellite communications”. [79]
The insurgents have also been receiving military supplies
by air. [80] The rebels are operating in groups of up
to 1,000 men in four-wheel
drive vehicles. [81] Eritrea has militarily, logistically
and politically assisted
the Darfur gunmen in its continuing attempts to destabilise
Sudan. Khartoum has lodged official complaints about
this involvement with
the United Nations and African Union. [82] The Sudanese
government has also pointed to the agreement signed
in the Eritrean capital
between Darfur gunmen and elements of the Beja Congress,
an armed anti-government group based in Eritrea. [83]
In addition, Asmara has
also continued to host Darfur rebel organisations.
The
Sudanese government has had grounds to doubt the
credibility of their counter-parts
in the Naivasha peace process, Dr John Garang and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
While engaged in peace talks
with Khartoum, the SPLA has both trained and helped
arm the Darfur rebels.
As observed above the International Crisis Group
has noted SPLA involvement
in training Darfur rebels. The ICG has also commented
on the SPLA involvement with the Darfur rebels: “While
the exact ties between
the SPLA and the Darfur rebels have not been documented,
there appear to be at least important tactical links.
The SPLA –
which has always recognised that the more rebellion
could be extended to the
rest of Sudan the better positioned it would be – encouraged
the Darfur insurgents
as a means to increase pressure on the government
to conclude a more favourable
peace deal at Naivasha.” [84]
Despite mounting evidence to the
contrary, SPLA spokesmen were still claiming as recently
as September 2004 that
the SPLA “has nothing to
do with the present rebellion in Darfur”. [85]
There have
also been reports of some degree of American involvement in
sustaining the insurgency. Writing in August 2004,
veteran Canadian foreign correspondent
Eric Margolis noted: “[The]
CIA has reportedly supplied
arms and money to Darfur’s rebels…Washington
is using Darfur’s
rebels, as it did in southern Sudan’s
thirty-year old insurgency, to
destabilize the Khartoum regime, whose policies have
been deemed insufficiently pro-American and too Islamic.
More important to the increasingly
energy-hungry US, Sudan has oil, as well as that
other precious commodity,
water.” [86] Disturbingly,
some level of American assistance
to the Sudan Liberation Army has been documented. [87]
The close involvement
in Darfur of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), led by long-time pro-SPLA activist
Roger Winter, provides the continuity for reports
of such support. There
is no doubt, for example, that USAID has been at
the heart of the “talking
up” of possible
deaths from the ongoing conflict, and
has played a central role in the declaration of “genocide” in
Darfur by the United States. [88]
Darfur: The New Afghanistan?
Any study
of the conflict in Darfur can now no longer ignore
the involvement of al-Qaeda
with the Islamist JEM organisation. There is no doubt
that al-Qaeda is deeply interested in Darfur. This
would be for several reasons.
One is the location of Darfur. American counterterrorism expert
Richard Miniter, in his latest book, Shadow War: The Untold
Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror, has reported
that the al-Qaeda network has for some time been establishing itself
in the Sahel area, an area which is made up of Niger,
Mali, Chad and Sudan. [89] Dozens
of al-Qaeda terrorists were killed in Chad in 2004. [90]
Miniter states that al-Qaeda involvement in Darfur “dovetails with
other reports from North Africa. The desert wastes
have become al- Qaeda’s
latest battleground.” [91] There
is no doubt that al-Qaeda is already
seeking to turn parts of the Sahel – and
in this case Darfur – into the next Afghanistan. [92]
There are many all-too-familiar ingredients.
Darfur’s physical inaccessibility, its Islamist
heritage, its proximity to several
failed or semi-failed states, porous borders, and
its inaccessibility to
western intelligence services make it a very attractive location to hide in and from which to attack.
Mr Tom Vraalsen,
the UN secretary-general’s
special envoy for
humanitarian affairs for Sudan, has pointed out some
of the regional implications
of the Darfur conflict: “A continuation
of the problems in Darfur
could have serious political repercussions in the
sense that it could destabilize
the area along the Chad-Sudan border and it could have
repercussions also regionally if it continues. It
has to be brought to an
end.” [93] Dr Ali Ali-Dinar, a Darfurian critic
of the government, has made
the simple point that “Peace in Darfur
is necessary for stabilising the
surrounding regions which include southern Sudan,
Chad, and Central African
Republic and to prevent the conflict spreading. The future
of the region is at stake.” [94] This is
also precisely why ultra Islamist groups such as
al-Qaeda would be interested in a continuing cycle of violence in Darfur. And
as with Afghanistan – and Iraq for that
matter – any Western military
intervention in Darfur would serve as a rallying
point for Islamist extremists, both within and outside of Darfur
and Sudan. Darfur in any instance is fertile ground for militant Islamic
groups such as al- Qaeda
and JEM. Al-Ahram, for example, has described Darfur
as a “
traditional Islamist stronghold”. [95] It was
from the Fur and Baggara that Muhammad
Ahmed, the “Mahdi”, drew the
fundamentalist shock troops that
crushed Egyptian rule in Sudan and held the British
Empire at bay for ten
years up till 1898, as noted by Margolis:
One of the Islamic World’s
first anti-colonial movements, known in the
west as the Dervishes, burst from the wastes of Darfur
in the1880s. Led by the fiery ‘Mahdi’,
the Dervishes drove the British
imperialists from the Sudan, and event immortalized
in the splendid Victorian
novel, ‘Four Feathers.’ The
Dervishes took Khartoum,
slaying Britain’s proconsul, Sir Charles ‘Chinese’ Gordon. [96]
And, in
Dr Turabi’s close involvement with
JEM, there is already a clear al-Qaeda
link. Knight-Ridder Africa editor Sudarsan Raghavan described
Turabi as “preaching a strict brand
of Islam that made Sudan a haven
for extremists such as bin Laden, whom Turabi once
called a hero”. [97]
That Bin Laden and Turabi are close is undisputed.
Richard Clarke, the Clinton
Administration’s anti-terrorism
supremo, described Turabi
as a “soul mate” of Osama bin
Laden who shared his “vision of a worldwide
struggle to establish a pure Caliphate”. [98]
Bin Laden is also married
to Turabi’s niece. [99] Many of those
members of the military wing of
the Popular Congress now involved with JEM trained
with al-Qaeda members
in the 1990s. Miniter states that al-Qaeda instructors,
including specialists in guerrilla and urban warfare
and logistics, have been involved
in training Justice and Equality insurgents in Darfur.
Al- Ahram has already
noted connections: “JEM also
is suspected of having links
with several militant Islamist groups in Africa and
around the world.” [100]
It is also worth noting that amongst the rebels there
is a selfstyled “
Tora Bora” militia – named after the
Afghan mountain range in which
Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the Taliban fought
one of their last battles, and from which bin Laden escaped American
capture. [101]
In another
analogy with Afghanistan, blind western support for
the
Darfur rebels, and especially JEM – for whatever
short-term political reasons – runs
the risk of repeating the mistake of building up
Islamist fundamentalist
forces which then themselves pose national and regional threats
to western interests. Providing Afghan and Arab fundamentalists, amongst
them a young Osama bin-Laden, with hundreds of millions
of dollars worth of military
and logistical support in the 1980s has been seen
as a tactical error which led to the birth of the
modern international terrorist
movement we see today.
The possible al-Qaeda-Darfur connection
is of concern to the United Nations. The Irish newspaper The Sunday Tribune reported
in December that “[t]he
threat of al-Qaeda opening another front against western
aid organisations and personnel in Darfur is real,
according to UN officials
in Sudan”. A senior UN official
noted that Darfur rebels had
already been made a specific threat to aid workers.
According to The Sunday
Tribune: “It fitted the pattern
of violence against western aid
organisations and personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq.” [102]
The fundamentalist involvement
has been poorly reported, but some details have
emerged. In July 2004, for example, a Saudi national
said to have been “preaching
holy war” within a refugee
camp in Chad was arrested. There
had been violent scenes at the camp in which two
refugees had been short dead by local security forces.
Arms caches had also been seized in the camp. [103]
It is worth
noting that the pattern of terrorism in Darfur has
echoed al- Qaeda and Islamist
tactics in Iraq, especially with regard to attacks
on policemen and police stations. [104]
Over 685 policemen have been murdered,
and hundreds more wounded, in terrorist attacks on policemen
in Darfur. The United Nations Secretary-General noted
in his October 2004 report
to the Security Council that Darfur rebels had attacked
a police station in Medo, in North Darfur, on 12 September 2004
and that “further SLA attacks on police
posts were reported on 14, 15,
17, 18, 19 and 22 September. Further SLA attacks
on police in Ghubayash
village, Western Kordofan, in the last week of September indicates
that these violations may not remain confined to
Darfur.” [105] The
Secretary-General’s November report noted
the “SLA reportedly attacked police posts nine times in October, killing
at least nine policemen.” [106] European Union military observers
mission have confirmed
rebel attacks on policemen in Darfur: “The
SLA has been attacking
continuously police stations.” [107]
These are just a few examples of
UN reports of attacks on policemen in Darfur. The
African Union has also
confirmed that “innocent policemen” have
been the “major victims” of
the rebels. [108] Knight-Ridder has also confirmed rebel
attacks on police stations. [109] Human Rights Watch
has reported: “Rebels have attacked
many police stations and posts in Darfur.” [110]
These attacks are of deep
concern for at least two reasons. Firstly, as agreed
with the United Nations,
and outlined in the joint government-UN action plan, the
deployment of police forces within Darfur was to
protect displaced people
and displaced peoples’ camps from attack
by criminal elements, Janjaweed
or otherwise. Attacks on police stations, therefore,
fuel civilian insecurity
in the region. Secondly, Darfur rebel attacks on policemen
have not only mirrored attacks in Iraq, but have
also been part of a pattern
of similar attacks on police stations within the
Sahel. Almost identical
sorts of attacks to those in Iraq and Darfur have occurred
as far apart as northern Nigeria and Liberia. [111]
This pattern of attacks
also begs a simple question. Why is the murder of
hundreds of poorly armed
policemen in Iraq deemed to be terrorism by the United States – with
all the consequences of that definition – while
the murder of hundreds
of poorly-armed policemen in Darfur appears not to
be
terrorism by the American government? Disturbingly,
it would seem that the
United States is actually helping to fund some of
the activities of the very
gunmen involved in killing the policemen – gunmen
who if not themselves
Islamist extremists are nevertheless closely allied
with the Justice and Equality Movement. [112]
The involvement
of foreign governments such as Eritrea, and foreign terrorist
networks, in encouraging the destabilisation of Darfur,
and their support for, and
arming of, insurgents is very serious. Any attempts
to stop the war by seeking
to address any marginalisation or underdevelopment – if
that was ever the motivation for the violence– will cut no ice with these forces.
Propaganda and Sensationalism within
To address
the Darfur crisis it is essential that events in Darfur
are evaluated as objectively
as possible. To do so observers must cut away the
pressure group politics – especially within
the United States – warrelated propaganda
and media sensationalism that has already distorted perceptions
of the Darfur crisis and Sudan. [113] The government has
stated that: “Those
with their own agendas are trying to give a very sad
view of what is happening.
The propaganda in the West is trying to exaggerate what
is taking place in Darfur.” [114] That the
Darfur issue has been enmeshed
at least in part in propaganda images and claims is
clear. It would be naïve
not to factor such a dimension into any study of the crisis.
There have been allegations of genocide, ethnic cleansing
and the use of chemical weapons
in Darfur. Recent claims, for example, of the use
of chemical weapons in the region have unravelled.
A prominent conservative German
newspaper, Die Welt, alleged that the Syrian and Sudanese
governments had used chemical weapons against civilians
in Darfur. [115] This claim,
although exposed as misinformation, was widely repeated
and serves as a further illustration of the propaganda
war surrounding Darfur. [116]
Similarly sensationalistic claims, while serving any
number of short-term political goals, complicate and
distort an already complex
issue. Much of the propaganda
which has come out of the Darfur conflict has emanated
from the rebels. Rebel claims across the board have
proved to be questionable.
As we have seen, rebel claims to be fighting against marginalisation
have been contradicted by reputable sources such as Ghazi
Suleiman. And, more recently, the SLA initially denied
any involvement in the November
2004 attacks in north Darfur, claiming that Khartoum’s
claims were “totally erroneous”. [117] The
international community was
in a position to verify the rebels’ complicity
and the UN, USA, Britain and
others roundly condemned the attacks, stating they
had once again clearly violated the cease-fire agreement. [118]
Even day-to-day claims such
as the SLA’s January 2004
to have shot down three Apache
helicopter gunships have shown their unreliability. [119]
That Khartoum had a fleet
of Apache attack helicopters would have come as news
to the American government who have strictly controlled purchases
of the Apache helicopter: Apaches have not yet even
been deployed by the British
army. The Die Welt “chemical
weapons” propaganda
story outlined above was sourced back to the SLA. [120]
The
Sudan Liberation Army has also appeared to contradict
themselves on critical issues
at critical times. At the end of November, SLA spokesman
Mahjoub Husayn declared that the movement was ending
its truce with the Sudanese
government: “Agreements
on a cessation of hostilities
signed in Ndjamena, Chad, last year and a security
protocol in Abuja, Nigeria,
signed earlier this month [are] null and void.” [121]
A day later, SLA leader Abd
al-Walid Mohamed al-Nur contradicted his spokesman,
claiming that “The SLM is committed
to fully respect the truce
and all the agreements reached since the 2004 ceasefire.” He
stated that “What the
spokesman for the SLM said about considering the agreements
we have signed as null and void is not true.” [122]
Any solution to the Darfur crisis
has to cut through the propaganda wall that is inevitably in place and move on. It is useful
therefore to assess some of the major allegations that have been made with
regard to events in Darfur.`
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