DARFUR IN PERSPECTIVE
By Professor David Hoile
Published by The European - Sudanese Public Affairs Council
Chapter 2
THE DARFUR PEACE PROCESS
There has been a breakdown in negotiations
because of unacceptable rebel demands. The talks have been
suspended:
it’s a failure. Chadian Government Peace Mediator, December 2003 [123]
The SLA started this war, and now they and Justice and Equality
Movement are doing everything possible to keep it going. American
State Department Official, October 2004 [124] The rebels came with
preconditions from the start of this meeting, only to scupper
any talks. Peace Talks Mediator, January 2005 [125]
The need to find a peaceful solution to the
horrendous war in Darfur is painfully self-evident.
The peace process that has unfolded over the past two
years has, however, been a difficult one. The Government of Sudan has
repeatedly declared its commitment to a peaceful solution to
the crisis. [126] Most recently, in January 2005,
on the eve of signing the historic peace agreement
ending Sudan’s north-south conflict,
President Bashir reiterated his commitment to
attaining a settlement of the war in Darfur. [127]
This was echoed by the head of the government’s
negotiating team, agriculture minister Dr Majzoub
al-Khalifa, who stated that the government would carry on negotiating
until there was a final peace deal. [128] The government
announced in January that Vice-President Ali Osman
Mohamed Taha, the man who negotiated an end to the longrunning war
in the south, would be focusing on the Darfur crisis. [129] Vice-President
Taha has stated that the conflict should be easier to resolve
than the north-south war. [130] The government has also involved northern
opposition parties, including the National Democratic Alliance, in
the search for peace. [131] The war was not of Khartoum’s
making and it is abundantly clear that the Sudanese
government has the most to lose in any continued
conflict. Sudan has welcomed the close involvement of both
the African Union and Chad as mediators, and has also agreed
and urged the deployment of thousands of African
Union peace-keeping forces. [132] The African Union
has committed itself to attaining peace in Darfur.
In January 2005, the chairman of the African Union, Nigerian president
Olusegun Obasanjo, stated: “I want to give you
one assurance on behalf of Nigeria and the AU.
We will not rest until there is peace and perfect peace in Darfur and in the whole of Sudan." [133]
As early as February 2003,
the government sought to defuse the conflict through
negotiations. [134] Initial attempts to engage in a dialogue with
the rebels in North
Darfur were said to have had some positive results. A local
tribal leader who had been abducted by
SLA gunmen had been freed. [135] Sudanese Vice-President
Ali Osman Taha has also had meetings with veteran
Darfurian opposition leader Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige
with a view to an immediate ceasefire. [136] Vice-President Taha and
Mr Diraige agreed that the proper way to settle the conflict
is through “dialogue”. [137] The Sudanese
interior minister’s
commitment to peace talks has been typical: “Whenever
(the rebels) are ready to talk, we are ready to
talk to them. We have no conditions at all.” [138]
It is also clear that the government appears to
have had no reservations about negotiating with
any rebel organisations, including those movements that
have recently been formed. This has included peace talks with
a third force calling itself the National Movement
for Reform and Development (NMRD). [139] NMRD came
into being in April 2004, when a group of rebels,
led by Nourene Manawi Bartcham, broke away from JEM because of a disagreement over the influence of the Popular Congress and Dr Turabi over the rebel movement. [140]
In
2003, the Chadian government, parts of which are drawn from
the Zaghawa
tribe, offered to mediate between the government and rebels. The
Sudanese government welcomed and has continued to welcome continuing
Chadian mediation in the conflict. [141] The government of Chad
was instrumental in negotiating ceasefires in western Sudan in September
2003 and earlier. It has been a challenging task. On 3 September
2003, however, as the result of indirect talks hosted
by President Déby, the Sudanese government
and rebels signed a six-week
ceasefire in Abeche, Chad. On 17 September, the government and
the
SLA signed an agreement allowing “free and unimpeded” humanitarian access
within Darfur. The government and rebels agreed to a tripartite ceasefire
monitoring commission made up of five members from both sides
and five Chadian military officials. In subsequent Chadianbrokered peace talks, the rebels proved to be intransigent. Chadian Government mediators declared in December 2003, for example,
that the
rebels had stalled peace talks: “There has been a breakdown
in negotiations because of unacceptable rebel
demands. The talks have been suspended: it’s
a failure.” [142] Chad’s
president called rebel terms for substantive
negotiations “unacceptable”. [143]
In what was seen as a deliberate attempt to
derail the peace talks, the SLA demanded military control
of the region during a transitional period, 13 percent of all
Sudan’s
oil earnings and SLA autonomy in administering Darfur. [144] It
was claimed that Islamic fundamentalist opponents of the Sudanese
government
had been instrumental in sabotaging these negotiations. [145]
The government named senior Popular Congress members Hassan
Ibrahim,
Suleiman Jamous, Abubakr Hamid and Ahmed Keir Jebreel as
having been responsible. [146] JEM had hitherto displayed a stop-start
attitude
to joining mediated peace talks. [147]
In March 2004, the Government of Sudan reaffirmed its commitment
to a just and peaceful solution to the conflict
in Darfur through consensus:“ Through political dialogue
a final agreement can be reached in the region. [148] Sudan’s
deputy foreign minister al-Tigani Salih Fidhail said his government was willing to take part in a conference Chad
has reportedly offered to host between Khartoum
and the Darfur rebels: “We are ready
to negotiate peace with any party but we reject any preconditions.” [149]
The April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict
On 8 April 2004, in Ndjamena, the Government of Sudan and both
rebel movements signed a Humanitarian
Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict
and a Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance
in Darfur. [150] Ahmad Alammi, the spokesman of the Chadian mediation
team, noted: “The humanitarian ceasefire was
a priority, but at the same time it
includes political clauses.” [151] Under
the Ceasefire Agreement, the parties
agreed, amongst other things, to: cease hostilities and
proclaim a cease-fire for a period of 45 days automatically renewable,
unless opposed by one of the parties; establish a Joint Commission
and a Ceasefire Commission, with the participation of the international
community, including the African Union; free all prisoners of
war and all other persons detained because of the armed
conflict in Darfur; facilitate the delivery
of humanitarian assistance and the creation of
conditions conducive to the delivery of emergency relief
to the displaced persons and other civilians victims of war, in
accordance with the Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance
in Darfur, referred to above. The parties
also agreed to: combine their efforts in order
to establish a global and definite peace in Darfur; meet
at a later stage within the framework
of a conference of all the representatives of Darfur
to agree on a global and definite settlement of the problems
of their region, especially concerning its socio-economic
development; contribute to create
an environment conducive to negotiation and stop hostile media campaigns.
Sudan welcomed the decision
by the African Union to send monitoring
teams to follow up implementation of the cease-fire agreement
between the government and the armed
groups in Darfur. [152] The AU’s commissioner
for peace and security, Said Djinnit, said: “Nigeria, Ghana,
Senegal and Namibia have agreed to send military officers
to be deployed as observers in Darfur.
They will be on the ground as soon as possible.” [153] Almost immediately, SLA spokesmen
stated that they would not honour the ceasefire
and would not attend peace talks aimed at establishing the envisaged
joint ceasefire monitoring commission. On 17 April 2004, however,
Reuters reported that they had changed their minds and would go
after all: “Rebels from western Sudan said on
Friday they would go to peace
talks and had not threatened to withdraw from a ceasefire, adding
that previous reports to the contrary were incorrect…Earlier
on Friday SLM/A spokesman Musa
Hamid al-Doa said the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) would not go to the peace talks and
would not abide by a ceasefire
in effect since Sunday…But
Al-Doa later said he had been
given misleading information and another spokesman retracted
his comments.” Mohammed Mursal, a spokesman
for the SLA secretary-general
stated: “No officially sanctioned
statements were made by the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) to imply that we would
not abide by the ceasefire or not go to Addis Ababa
or Chad.” Reuters reported
that “Analysts say there is infighting
in the SLM/A’s leadership with a power struggle between prominent
figures in the armed and political wings. Mursal said there would
be an internal investigation to establish
what had led to the confusion.” [154]
The International Crisis Group documented some
of the rebel splits during the April peace talks: “The
presence in N’djamena
of exiled political activist Sharif Harir as a
coordinator for the SLA team was a precursor of
some of these internal tensions. He apparently sidelined SLA
chairman Abdel Wahid…A similar split occurred in JEM.
Hassan Khames Juru, a self-proclaimed political
coordinator, announced the dismissal of the JEM
president, Khalil Ibrahim, his brother Jibril, the general
secretary, Mohamed Bechir Ahmed, and the coordinator, Abubakar
Hamid Nour, who had led JEM negotiators at the ceasefire talks.
JEM’s military spokesman, Colonel Abdalla Abdel
Karim, quickly denounced the statement and said
Juru represented only himself.” [155]
The International Crisis Group also noted the
results of these splits: “
Confusion reigned among the rebels at the political talks in
late April [2004], with the two groups eventually
repudiating the deal their delegations accepted. The mixed signals are indicative of serious infighting between the military and political wings…The
SLA sought to settle some of these differences
in prolonged consultations between its chairman,
Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour, and its military coordinator, Minni
Arkou Minawi. JEM, reflecting the strong position of its political leader,
Khalil Ibrahim, took a different approach, firing dissident commanders
and political cadres deemed disloyal.” [156] In
April 2004, for example, Khalil Ibrahim dismissed
the movement’s second-incommand, Jibril Abdel Karim Bare.
The two rebel groups have rejected government proposals for
roundtable conferences on Darfur – despite
having agreed on 19 April to attend a peace
and development conference in Khartoum for all Darfur leaders,
including the rebels, to be chaired by Idriss Déby,
the Chadian president. A 130-strong preparatory
committee were planning for some 1,700 delegates.
The JEM leader stated: “We will not participate
in this conference nor do we recognise it.” In
late April 2004 the rebels declared once again they would not participate
in the ceasefire talks in Addis Ababa or the political negotiations
in Ndjamena. Reuters reported that Darfur rebels were unlikely
to attend peace talks to end the fighting in Darfur. The SLA
had said “it would not attend the political
talks due to reconvene on April 24 in Chad,
adding it wanted Eritrea to mediate instead of [Chadian] President
Idriss Debby [sic].” Reuters noted that “Sudan
has poor relations with Eritrea”. Reuters
also quoted JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim: “
I don’t think we are going to Chad. The Chadian President
should not chair any meeting nor any of his
executives.” [157] Even
the hitherto rebelfriendly United States warned
the rebels against boycotting the talks aimed
at creating a commission to monitor the Darfur ceasefire. A
State Department spokesperson stated: “The
United States expects the parties...to actively
engage in the planning and implementation of the ceasefire
monitoring team. Failure of any party to fully participate
in this crucial part of the ceasefire agreement
is a clear statement of bad faith and will affect our relationship with them.” [158]
In late April 2004, al-Haj
Atta al-Manan, secretary of the ruling National Congress
party in Khartoum State, and a former governor of South Darfur,
revealed that he had led a government delegation that held secret discussions
with the exiled JEM leadership in Paris in late March. The joint
statement that came out of that meeting spoke of a peaceful solution
as the preferred way to settle the crisis. [159]
In early
May 2004 Chadian peace mediators reported that the government
had complained at rebel violations of the ceasefire, citing government
claims that “The rebels are looting and
threatening civilians”. The complaint
also accused rebels of livestock rustling, a particularly
provocative action in western Sudan. [160] By late May 2004,
the Government stated that there had been 26 rebel violations
of the cease-fire in West Darfur alone.
On 24 May the governor of South Darfur
state said that there had been several rebel attacks on
villages and civilians. He cited attacks
on Abgaragil village, 50 kilometres south of the
state capital of Nyala: “The outlaws attacked
this area, looting and burning down
the village, and when our forces arrived to the area they were
already gone.”
He also said that on 18 May rebels
had also attacked Labarwa village,
about 60 kilometres (40 miles) northeast of Nyala
and kidnapped 28 civilians. He stated that most rebel attacks
and violations were along roads from
Nyala to other key provincial towns, particularly
Dyeing and Buram to the south: “The
outlaws in high-speed cars will attack
an area, and when we arrive they are gone”. [161] To
work out logistical details for the ceasefire monitoring
commission, the AU sent a reconnaissance
mission to Sudan, including Darfur and Chad,
from 7 to 13 May. Representatives from the UN, EU, US and France were on the mission.
On 22 May 2004, the SLA rejected
AU proposals to meet with the government and finalise the formation
of a ceasefire commission, claiming
that Ethiopia was too closely aligned to the Sudanese
government. [162]
Nevertheless, on 28 May the government and rebels
signed an agreement establishing a joint ceasefire commission
along with the modalities for international
observers. On 4 June 2004, the African
Union and other international observers finalised an
agreement with
the government setting out the terms of the ceasefire
observer mission agreed in the April ceasefire protocol. The
agreement set
out the relationship between Khartoum
and the ceasefire committee in Darfur
and which gives the observers free entry into Sudan and free
movement inside the country. In
total,
an initial group of 120 observers from the
AU, the European Union, the United States, the Sudanese government,
the
two rebel groups in Darfur and the mediation team from
neighbouring Chad was to be deployed in the region. [163] On 9 June
2004, the African Union established a headquarters
in al-Fasher from which to monitor the ceasefire,
and from which to deploy these military
observers. [164]
During a June 2004 summit
of nine African presidents and government officials
attending a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa summit
in Kampala, the Sudanese president restated his desire to end
the conflict in Darfur: “We are committed
and determined to resolving the current conflict
in Darfur in western Sudan.” [165]
Government attempts to reach
a peaceful solution included both domestic and international efforts.
In mid-June 2004, for example, the government outlined
plans for the convening of a
National Conference for Development and Peaceful
Co-existence in Darfur to be held in Khartoum aimed
at addressing issues of concern
and reaching a peaceful solution for the Darfur
issues. [166] And a week later the government continued
with international efforts.
Sudanese government peace negotiators left for peace
talks with the representatives of Darfur rebels in
Berlin. [167] Shortly afterwards
peace negotiators led by Sudan’s Deputy
Humanitarian Affairs Minister,
Mohammed Yusif Abdallah, travelled to France for peace talks with representatives of JEM. [168]
In early July 2004, both the
SLA and JEM stated that they would not attend
further peace talks in Chad. A SLA leader said: “We
do not want Chad to mediate
for the political issues because they were not fair
in the humanitarian talks.” [169]
The president of the African Union, Alpha Oumar
Konare, announced that the first round of AU-mediated
political negotiations between the warring parties
to try to end the crisis were to begin
in mid-July in Addis Ababa: “The problem
with Darfur is political,
its solution is political, hence the necessity for
the parties to quickly
begin political negotiations... on July 15 in Addis
Ababa. We hope that all
the parties are properly represented”. [170]
The Justice and Equality
Movement declared, however, that it would not be
joining political negotiations
in the Addis Ababa aimed at ending the crisis: “
These negotiations are coming too quickly”.
It is worth noting that the United
Nations placed on record a renewal of attacks on
humanitarian convoys in
Darfur by gunmen from this date onwards. [171] The rebels’ commitment
in any instance to talks in July was questionable.
Al-
Jazeera reported: “AU officials who struggled
for three days to convene a
rebel-government meeting said their task had never
looked very promising
because Darfur’s top rebel leaders
had chosen instead to attend a Sudanese opposition conference held in Eritrea.” [172]
Rebel attacks on humanitarian
aid personnel continued. In the first week
of July, the SLA attacked 26 aid workers, working
for Save the Children UK,
delivering emergency assistance in northern Darfur.
They also stole six
vehicles. On 13 July 2004, the British government
urged Sudanese rebels
to return the stolen vehicles. [173] Rebels also attacked
a relief convoy near
Orishi in North Darfur, murdering nine civilians
and several policemen.
They also attacked another aid convoy north of
al- Fasher, killing
four truck drivers. Rebels also abducted Abass
Daw Albeit, the traditional leader of all the tribes
of eastern Darfur. [174]
In early August the African
Union announced that the Sudanese
government had agreed to increase in peacekeeping
forces and monitors in
Darfur from 300 to 2,000 soldiers. [175] The second
round of African Union-sponsored inter-Sudanese peace talks
was held in Abuja, Nigeria, from 23 August to 17
September 2004. The government
declared: “Our concern is to
find a quick peaceful solution
to all the unresolved questions.” [176]
The Nigerian President, Olusegun
Obasanjo, hailed the adoption by both sides of a
broad agenda of humanitarian,
security and political issues as a “first step
in the right direction”.
The negotiations were almost immediately deadlocked
when the Darfur rebel groups backtracked on the previously
agreed agenda. Abd al-Wahid Mohamed al-Nur, leader of the Sudan
Liberation Army,
stated: “We in the movement reject this agenda
completely.” The rebels’ move
was described by mediators as a “blow
to the African Union”. The leader
of the Sudanese government delegation, agriculture
minister Majzoub al-Khalifa,
reiterated that “We adopted
this agenda in front of President
Obasanjo and AU and UN representatives this morning,
and we are good to our
word. We are very keen to continue these negotiations.” The
Sudanese government also accused the rebels of several
breaches of the existing ceasefire agreement, including
an attack in which four
Sudanese humanitarian workers and two journalists
were kidnapped. The government
spokesman Ibrahim Mohammed Ibrahim stated: “Despite
all that, we will continue to participate in these negotiations
with the same spirit. Hopefully there will be an
agreement between us and
the rebel groups.” [177] The agenda,
made up of the following
items - humanitarian issues, security issues, political
issues and socio-economic
issues - was eventually agreed. On day three of the talks, the Sudanese government agreed to accept a
larger African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur if the troops are used
to contain and demobilise
rebel forces. The African Union had suggested the supervised
cantonment of rebel and government forces as a step
towards a peaceful solution
to the crisis. [178] Rebel leaders subsequently refused
to discuss the issue of cantonment. The JEM spokesman
stated: “We insist that this point be taken off the agenda.” [179]
Rebel intransigence was being
increasingly noted. The New York Times’ Scott
Anderson observed: “In recent
months, the SLA has repeatedly
stalled peace talks being brokered by the African
Union by setting unrealistic
preconditions or quibbling over such details as
where the talks should
be held; for its part the Justice and Equality
Movement faction had,
until recently, boycotted the talks altogether.” Anderson cited
an American diplomat: “The first notion
anyone’s got to disabuse themselves
of is that there are any good guys in this. There
aren’t. The S.L.A.
started this war, and now they and Justice and
Equality Movement are doing everything possible to keep
it going.” [180]
American journalist Sam Dealey
pointed to possible reasons for
apparent rebel indifference to peace talks: “The
international community may
wish to restrain from setting early deadlines
for intervention. Such deadlines
only encourage rebel intransigence in pursuing
peace deals, as last
month’s unsuccessful talks in Ethiopia
proved. With outside action threatened,
there is little incentive for the rebels to negotiate
a lasting cease-fire.” [181]
This was a general point also raised by the Sudanese foreign
minister during his September 2004 address to
the United Nations
general assembly. [182] The talks nevertheless ended with the agreeing
of a Protocol on the Improvement
of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur which
addressed the issue
of free movement and access for humanitarian
workers and assistance
as well as the protection of civilians. Sudan
agreed to the deployment
of more than three thousand AU peacekeeping troops
in Darfur. [183] The parties also agreed the establishment
of a Joint Humanitarian
Facilitation and Monitoring Unit - based in al-Fasher
- to ensure a
more effective monitoring of the commitments
they had entered into.
It was also agreed to request the UN High Commission
for Human Rights
to expand the number of its human rights monitors
in Darfur.
In the lead-up to the next rounds of talks
the rebels intensified their
attacks in Darfur, attacks which severely impeded
the delivery of emergency
aid to Darfur. In October 2004, the UN confirmed
rebel responsibility
for attacks in Darfur, quoting the UN’s
Envoy to Sudan:“
Mr Pronk said rebel groups - the Sudan Liberation
Army (SLA) and the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) - were responsible
for much of the
recent violence, which is restricting humanitarian
access to many areas
within Darfur, a vast and desolate region in
western Sudan.” [184]
The
third round of African Union-mediated Darfur
peace talks was held in
Abuja from 21 October to 9 November 2004. Despite
the urgent and immediate
ongoing humanitarian crisis, the rebels refused
to discuss humanitarian
issues. A JEM leader said: “The
government is insisting on discussing
the humanitarian issue. It only wants to waste
time and avoid the
real issue on ground.” [185] The rebels
also stalled the peace talks because
of the African Union’s seating
plans, stating they did not wish to
sit near the government negotiators. Abubakr
Hamid, the coordinator of
the joint JEM/SLA team, declared: “We
are not going to participate…because
they are trying to force us to sit with governmen
delegates.” [186] He added: “We’d
rather the African Union appoints two
separate teams to negotiate with the two groups.” [187]
When the rebels returned to the negotiations,
having agreed to sit with the government, they
then continued to refuse to sign a humanitarian aid agreement
essential for the provision of relief to those affected by the war.
A European diplomat said: “We’ve told the rebels
that for them to be seen as blocking the signature
of the humanitarian protocol is not very good…The
rebels should not take the international community for granted.
They think they have all the international sympathies, but if they
are seen as the ones who are stalling they will have to pay a price.” [188]
The second round of AU-sponsored talks had focused on the humanitarian
crisis but the rebels refused to sign new humanitarian arrangements.
JEM’s Haroun Abdulhameed said that the rebels
would focus only on power-sharing: “We are
not going to harp on humanitarian issues. There
is no need for that…The government in insisting
on discussing the humanitarian issue only wants
to waste time…” The Sudan Liberation
Army spokesman stated: “We must tackle
the political issue above everything if we are to make any progress…” [189]
After considerable time invested
in mediation, this round of talks
resulted in the signing of a Protocol on the Enhancement of
the Security Situation in Darfur and the signing
of the Protocol on the Improvement of the
Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, as discussed and agreed at
the previous round of talks on 9 November
2004. The government and rebels agreed to
renew a cessation of hostilities and, for the first time, the
government agreed to renounce “hostile” military
flights over Darfur, except in cases of self-defence. [190]
The two sides had also initiated discussion
on a draft Declaration of Principles which would constitute
the basis for a just, comprehensive and durable settlement
of the conflict. [191]
In early November 2004, in an official report,
the UN Envoy to Sudan pointed to deliberate attempts
by the rebel movement to provoke government responses: “Some
commanders provoke their adversaries by stealing,
hijacking and killing”. [192] In November, the Sudanese government
attacked the United Nations for not highlighting rebel involvement
in attacks and human rights abuses, while focusing undue attention
on the government. The humanitarian affairs minister, Ibrahim Hamid,
said the international community must pressure rebel groups, and
not the government alone, to end the Darfur conflict: “The
silence of the United Nations and its reluctance
to denounce the rebels and exercise pressure on
them has encouraged the rebels to go on with their violations
and spur insecurity. We believe...the international community should
exercise pressure on the rebels instead of seeking to condemn
the government over minor issues.” [193]
The SLA’s November 2004 Violation of the Peace
Accords
Despite having signed the
Abuja ceasefire protocols on 9 November,
less than two weeks later the SLA mounted several systematic
attacks on police and civilians in Darfur.
The African Union noted that “in
late November, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
(SLM/A) carried out attacks on various
places, including Tawila, in North Darfur, Adwah village,
in South Darfur, the town of Um-Asal and at Draida. These attacks
constitute serious and unacceptable violations of the…N’djamena
Agreement and the Abuja Protocols.” [194]
The rebels coordinated attacks on, amongst
other targets, Tawila in North Darfur and
Kalma in South Darfur. On 22 November 2004, some 80-100 rebels attacked
the police station on the edge of the Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur.
This resulted in the death of four policemen, and the wounding of
several others. The WFP confirmed the attack and stated that“ ominously,
the attack appeared to have been launched from inside Kalma
camp”. [195] The UN Envoy to Sudan said that he condemned “in the
strongest terms the killing of policemen and civilians around
Kalma camp”. [196] In a separate attack,
coordinated to start at the same time as the
assault on Kalma, several hundred SLA rebels, travelling in
landcruisers and lorries, attacked Tawila,
killing a doctor, 22 policemen and several
civilians, and by their actions, forcing the evacuation of
aid workers from the surrounding refugee camps. [197]
As The New York Times noted,
these attacks, and the ones that preceded them,
ended the stability, a “respite” that
had been achieved in Darfur - especially
with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance
to war-affected communities: “But what respite
had been achieved over the last several
months has steadily unravelled in recent days”.
The government noted that the Tawila and Kalma attacks had brought
the number of rebel violations since the signing of the Abuja ceasefire
protocol to 19: 12 in South Darfur, six in North Darfur and
one in West Darfur: “Now the international
community has seen for itself. We consider
this a very serious escalation and a very alarming index
of the rebel attitude.” [198] That
the attacks had disrupted a period of relative peace
was also confirmed by the African Union’s own ceasefire monitoring
commission. In its October 2004 report, for example, the ceasefire
commission noted that there was a “relative
calm”. [199] The British aid agency
Oxfam confirmed that there had been “improving humanitarian
access” but that the attacks had reversed
any gains that had been made: “Humanitarian
access is worse than it was 6 months ago.” [200]
These
attacks, and particularly the one on Tawila, were very important for
several reasons. It illustrated once and for all the indifference
the Darfur rebels displayed to the internationally-mediated
peace and ceasefire protocols it had signed only a few days previously.
They were designed to provoke a government reaction in the lead-up
to several important international meetings on Sudan – at the
expense of suffering to hundreds of thousands of the very people the rebels were
claiming to be protecting. As much was confirmed by British television
news coverage some days after the attack: “What happened
here was an act of war. But it was an act of war provoked by the rebels to make
the government look bad ahead of this week’s peace talks.” [201]
The attacks also showed that the indifference of the rebel movements
to the devastating humanitarian consequences of its actions. The
attack on Tawila shut down WFP operations in North Darfur: “All
WFP staff and many NGOs were withdrawn from the field.” The rebel
action resulted in 300,000 IDPs being “cut off from WFP food aid”. [202]
It was also significant because it was one of the first occasions when
the
international community chose to unambiguously challenge
the Darfur
rebels.
The New York Times described the attack and some of the
consequences:
At dawn on Monday, according
to the United Nations, the rebelSudan Liberation Army, or SLA,
attacked a strategic town just westof [al-Fasher], called Tawilah,
killing nearly 30 police officers and taking control of the
town…Insurgents from a second group, called Justice and
Equality Movement, seized another Darfur town, called Gareida,
before pulling back. In a refugee camp in South Darfur,rebels
struck at a police post in the middle of the night. Rebels
battled government troops in Kuma, just north of [al-Fasher],
on the edge ofr ebel-held territory last weekend. The human
consequences of ther ash of violent actions are getting grimmer.
Practically all roads out ofE l-Fashir, the North Darfur state
capital, are off limits to aid workers, for security reasons…Mobile
clinics that once roamed to rebel-held villages north and south of here are now staying off the road. [203]
International criticism of these attacks was
universal, immediate and unambiguous. The UN Envoy
to Sudan Jan Pronk stated that the SLA was solely
responsible for breaching the ceasefire and restarting the fighting
in north Darfur: “This was a unilateral violation
of the agreement by SLA, not by the government.” [204]
He declared that: “I do really think that
the international community should hold them (SLA) accountable
for not complying with international agreements and their own
promises.” [205] The rebel attacks were also condemned
by the American government. The State Department
said: “The latest
incidents of violence were instigated by the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army, and they have resulted
in the suspension of humanitarian activities in the areas
of fighting.” [206] Chris Mullins, Minister of State
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, noted
that: “The recent difficulties
have been caused by a series of violations predominately
initiated by the rebels.” He cited the finding
by the UN Envoy to Sudan that “the
rebels have been the principal cause in the last
two months of incidents that have caused the breakdown
of the ceasefire…”
[207] His views
were echoed by the British international development
minister, Hilary Benn: “Recent rebel attacks
on Tawila and on humanitarian convoys in Darfur, along with
the murder of two Save the Children UK staff are particularly horrific.” [208]
Three days after the attack the Sudanese government
called for the rebels to honour their commitments
and seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. The government also
called for the return of
the aid workers who had been evacuated as
a result of the attacks. [209] In early December
2004, the SLA admitted to kidnappings, attacks on civilians
and obstructing aid workers. The organisation promised there would
be no more incidents. [210] On 5 December 2004, the Sudanese government
released documents which it said showed that the rebels had killed
89 people in more than 300 armed robberies since the April
2004 ceasefire. A Sudanese interior minister
stated that the number of armed robberies
in Darfur in eight months following the ceasefire was higher than
in the previous 15 months. The documents indicated that from
1 January 2003 to April 2004 there were 251
armed robberies in which 80 people had been
murdered. From April until the end of November there were 320 armed robberies during which 89 people were killed. [211]
Keeping the Aid Corridors Open
In the 5 December briefing
the Sudanese government recorded that rebels
had attacked over 200 trucks: “The policy, we
understand, is aimed at strangling the
main towns in Darfur. The rebels seem to not be keen
on committing themselves to the accords they signed. Although
we are committed to the letter to the
agreements and protocols ... the state could
not be expected to tolerate this nonsense.” [212]
This point was also restated later in
December: “[The rebels] block roads,
impede commercial activities, rob people
and commit all sorts of crimes. No responsible
government can fold its hands when things like these are
happening.”[213] This underpins the quandary facing the
government. While committing itself to
a ceasefire, government forces cannot stand by
and let humanitarian and other traffic be attacked on its
main roads. Such attacks do indeed strangle
the logistics needed to feed the hundreds of
thousands of displaced people in camps throughout Darfur.
Not to do so would result in deaths and
more misery amongst displaced communities.
When Khartoum does militarily respond, with or without airpower, it is then accused of violating the ceasefire.
This dilemma was reported
upon by the United Nations Secretary
General in his report of January 2005. [214] The Secretary-General
stated, for example, that the fighting
which broke out on 7 December was a result
of “government road-clearing operations, which
the Government defined as operations
aimed at clearing the roads of banditry”.
The Secretary-General noted that the
government had briefed the United Nations
on their intentions and that Khartoum had “specifically
stated that it was not intending to
attack or occupy SLM/A-held areas during these
operations”. The government went on to identify
several key aid corridors. The Secretary-General
also noted that in its attempts to keep aid
corridors open the government had previously offered to
place any necessary police forces under
African Union command. The UN noted that
this offer had been declined at the 24 November 2004 meeting
of the Joint Implementation Mechanism. [215]
The Secretary-General also noted government
concerns about SLA attacks on roads. In addition to obstructing
the flow of aid to war-affected communities in Darfur,
these attacks “have brought constricting
pressure to bear on supply lines, leading
to rising commodity prices and insecurity of strategic
goods to the population of state capitals”.
The Secretary-General himself also noted “SLM/A
vehicle and fuel hijacking operations aimed at vital tactical
commodities”. He also reported on a “new
trend” in the pattern of attacks on, and harassment
of, international aid workers: “While previous
incidents have only been aimed at looting supplies and
goods, December has seen acts of murder
and vicious assaults on staff, forcing some agencies to leave Darfur.” [216]
The government position is
a clear one. It has called for the complete
deployment of all the AU forces envisaged for Darfur: “If
the African troops can’t defend
the roads and civilians, the government must do that. We
can’t leave the rebels to cut the roads that reach
(the 5 million civilians in Darfur).” [217]
In early December 2004, nonetheless,
Sudan’s Minister
for
Humanitarian Affairs, Mohamed Yusif Abdallah, reaffirmed Khartoum’s
desire for a negotiated settlement to the crisis, stating
that a settlement for Darfur could
be part of a broader constitutional reform also
affected other regions: “The southern peace
agreement will have a positive
impact on Darfur. By induction we expect to sign the
agreement in Darfur in the next
two months…I hope the situation
becomes like the south where the
rebels commit themselves seriously to a ceasefire.” [218] The
first week of December, however, saw continuing rebel
attacks which forced the withdrawal
of more aid workers from Darfur. Attacks, for
example, on Saraf Ayat in north Darfur, had resulted
in Médecins Sans Frontières
evacuating its staff and the displacement of 2,000 civilians.
Some 4,500 people were affected by this attack and
others. [219] In December the SLA,
and its obstruction of the peace process, came under
close scrutiny by The New York Times. The newspaper
reported that: “The SLA
has been accused of stalling at the last round of African Union-mediated
peace talks in Abuja. Despite promises, it has yet
to disclose the location of its fighters, on security
grounds. Privately, some aid
workers and diplomats accuse the SLA of sowing the
seeds of further conflict
by acts of provocation.” The
New York Times gave an example
of such provocation: “For instance, the
rebel group has blocked the
seasonal migration routes of a large and powerful nomadic
Arab tribe just south of [Thabit].
To date, the leaders of the tribe have remained
neutral in the Darfur conflict, but blocking the movement
of
their animals and thus threatening their livelihood
and their way of life could
be disastrous.” The newspaper quoted a
Western diplomat as saying
that the rebels were “broadening the conflict
base. The SLA knows what they are doing.” [220]
Under pressure from the international
community, the rebels came back
to the peace table. The fourth round of African Union-mediated
Darfur peace talks was held
in Abuja from 11 to 21 December. Reuters reported that
the government indicated its wish to reach a peace
deal in the African Union
talks which had recommenced in Abuja. Majzoub al- Khalifa,
head of Sudan’s delegation said there
was “a lot of common ground
for agreement”. He said: “We are
very much hoping to come to a final
peace agreement in this round” adding that
the government would do
its best to reach an agreement “before the
end of this year so that peace
in Sudan will be finalised by January in all parts
of Sudan”. JEM leader
Khalil Ibrahim dismissed the meeting, declaring “[t]his
is not a serious round of
talks” and that JEM had lost
faith in African Union sponsorship
of Darfur peace efforts. [221] News agencies reported
in mid- December that the
rebels had pulled out of the Abuja peace talks. [222]
This also coincided with
new rebel attacks aimed at disrupting peace process. The
African Union confirmed as much. [223] The African Union’s
chief mediator, Sam Ibok,
said that all the international representatives at
the talks had advised against
the walk-out because “there
was no justification for
such a suspension.” The Sudanese
government commented that: “Only negotiation
and talks will solve the problem of Darfur. Withdrawal from the talks means more trouble
for Darfur.” [224]
The rebels returned to the
AU-mediated talks and progress appeared to have
been made during these negotiations. The government agreed to withdraw
its forces from positions it had moved into following the rebels’ November
offensive in Tawila and elsewhere. [225] And while the rebels
rejected new proposals for peace [226] , they promised no more attacks
and violations of the ceasefire agreements. [227] The SLA and JEM committed
themselves “to cease all attacks
against humanitarian and commercial
activities and to restrain their forces from attacks
on government infrastructure, including police posts”. [228]
The rebels broke their word
within days with two serious attacks. On 27 December,
rebel forces attacked the town of Ghubaysh. The United Nations
said that “notably” this was “the
second attack by the SLA since 19
December when the Government of Sudan agreed
to an immediate cessation
of hostilities.” [229] In
late December Reuters reported that JEM had refused
any continuing African
Union mediation in the Darfur conflict, citing
a rebel spokesman: “JEM
is rejecting the African Union, We are not going
to Abuja again under
the auspices of the African Union.” [230]
This was a particular
blow to the peace process as the future rounds
of peace talks were
to focus on the political solution to the Darfur
conflict. The government had already announced
a range of proposals focusing on a federal solution to the problem. [231]
The Sudanese government showed
its frustration at the unwillingness of the
Darfur rebels to seriously commit to the peace talks: “At
the last round in Abuja where the vital political
issues was to be discussed, [the] government
came ready with six ministers. That shows we were here for business.
But the rebels had a different agenda. They delegated very junior
officers who could not agree on anything. It is no wonder that [they]
keep frustrating the talks via incessant walkouts.” [232] In
early 2005, the rebels announced that they would be leaving the ceasefire
commission in Darfur. Reuters reported that the UN had said“
a rebel threat to withdraw from a cease-fire
monitoring commission in Sudan’s
troubled Darfur region would spell disaster
for the faltering peace process”. A UN spokesperson warned: “Obviously,
if the SLA make this threat a matter of fact…that
would be a disastrous thing to happen
because we do not believe that any of the parties
have any interest
in destroying the little fragile gains they
have (made).” [233] Reuters
reported that officials at the January 2005
cease-fire talks“
blamed the rebels for the meeting’s failure”.
A peace mediator stated:“
The rebels came with preconditions from the start
of this meeting, only to
scupper any talks.” [234] The rebels subsequently
suspended their participation in the ceasefire committee and
rebel attacks continued. [235]
It has also emerged that while promising no
new attacks – having clearly been
stung by the international community’s
criticism following the Tawila
and Kalma attacks, the SLA has been using
front groups for some
of its new attacks. In December 2004, a group
styling itself the“ Sudanese National
Movement for the Eradication of Marginalisation” (SNMEM)
commenced attacks on civilians and policemen.
It attacked an
oil field at Sharif in Darfur and then a
town in western Kordofan, an area
neighbouring Darfur, killing 15 people. [236]
Reuters reported in early January
2005 that “[the] government
and some observers have said the group
is a front for…the Sudan Liberation
Army”. [237] The government stated: “There
is evidence showing the involvement of the
Sudan Liberation
Movement in the attack”. [238]
Reuters cited an international observer
as saying: “It seems the SNMEM
is the SLM with a different name.
They feel that if they use another name,
they can act without being
bound by the agreements they have signed
with the government ”On
13 January 2005, the Sudanese government
urged the complete deployment of the African Union peacekeeping
force in Darfur. The foreign minister, Dr Mustapha Osman Ismail,
stated that less than half of the
3,320 troops committed by the African Union
had arrived: “We are still
waiting for the African troops.” [239]
This echoed his previous call on 1
December 2004 for the African Union to fulfil
its commitment to Darfur. [240]
Problems Facing the Peace Process
There are,
however, a number of serious problems with regard to the rebel
movements and peace in Darfur. Perhaps the
first question must be whether or not the rebel movements themselves
actually want to end the war they started? This question runs central
to the issue of what motivated the conflict in the first place.
It is clear that what they claim to have been
fighting for is on offer. As the International
Crisis Group has quite rightly noted: “Darfur’s
problems are
negotiable - under the right circumstances
- and could fit relatively smoothly
into the governance structures being negotiated
between the government
and the SPLA at Naivasha. In particular,
the state autonomy models
for the northern states of the Nuba Mountains
and Southern Blue Nile
could offer the basis for a resolution
in Darfur. They provide for a high
degree of autonomy for sub-national states
and greatly increased provincial
control over decisions affecting local
administrations, including
on education and legal systems, and could
offer a template with
which to begin discussions on a political
settlement for Darfur.” [241] Autonomy
has already been put on the table by the
Sudanese government. [242]
The question is whether or not one or more
of the rebel movements
have been pursuing a different agenda other
than that of “
overcoming” marginalisation through
some level of power and wealth sharing.
This is of particular concern with regard
to the Justice and Equality
Movement. Is their war less one against
marginalisation and more
of an Islamist war by proxy in Darfur with
the objective of reinstating Turabi
or the Popular Congress in power? If this
is the case then
they will presumably continue to seek ways
of weakening or destabilising
the Khartoum government by keeping the
conflict going, hoping
that there might be some sort of Western
military intervention which
the ultra-Islamist Popular Congress would
then be able to exploit domestically.
There are also question marks
over the Sudan Liberation Army’s genuine
commitment to the peace process. The SLA’s transparent attempt
to launch attacks in December 2004 in violation of international ceasefire
agreements by using front groups such as the “Sudanese National
Movement for the Eradication of Marginalisation” does not augur
well. It demonstrates a cynical intention on the part of the
SLA to continue violence while paying vestigial
lip-service to a peace process. That
both rebel movements have procrastinated within, and delayed,
the peace process is a matter of record.
In addition to being obstructionist during
the rounds of peace talks, they have
also sought to destabilise the peace
process itself by first objecting to
the Chad government’s (successful)
attempts at mediation, and then by refusing
to continue with African Union mediation.
Even assuming that the rebel movements
want peace, and they genuinely
seek a political solution to the Darfur
crisis, defining their political
demands is difficult. For one thing,
as the ICG has noted, although
the rebel movements are arguing for
democracy “their own democratic
credentials remain open to question”. [243]
Leaving
JEM’s political agenda
to one side, even that of the Sudan Liberation
is far from coherent. Time Magazine
has noted that “The SLA’s
ultimate goals remain murky. Over the
years, its leaders have advocated
everything from secession to greater
representation in local government
to the capitulation of the central
government.” The anti- Khartoum
International Crisis Group has also
observed: “They haven’t to
this day clarified their political
objectives or presented them in a coherent
way.” [244] The implication
of this incoherence has been spelled out
in October 2004 by The New York Times: “The
rebels’ political goals
have never been clear, beyond vague
demands for the sharing of wealth
and power in Sudan. That could be a
potential stumbling block in [peace]
talks.” [245] Two months later,
in the wake of the Tawila attack, The
New York Times returned to the issue: “[J]ust
what does [the SLA] want
politically and how does it intend
to reach its objective through its gunmen…Nearly
two years after the insurgency began,
its political demands
remain vague – beyond claims
for a greater share of Sudan’s economic and political spoils.” [246]
In the absence of any coherent political agenda
on the part of the Sudan Liberation Army looms
the spectre of Somalian-type warlordism. In November
2004, the UN Special Envoy to Sudan spoke of this possibility. [247]
Mr Pronk said that rebel leaders must control their forces or “we
may soon find Darfur is ruled by warlords”. [248]
The SLA’s track record in this respect has
been appalling leading to direct African Union criticism
of the behaviour of its members: “[W]e don’t
think it is right or normal for any movement that
is trying to be a political movement to be involved in banditry”. [249]
There is also considerable concern about the rebel movements’ control over
its own forces. Perhaps the most benign reading of the November 2004
attacks on towns such as Tawila is that it revealed apparent
rebel difficulties with regard to control
of their fighters in Darfur. The UN described
the rebel attack as an example of “a crisis of
leadership” within the SLA. Knight-Ridder’s
Sudarsan Raghavan described the situation
as “an obstacle to achieving peace in Darfur”.
Raghavan confirmed that “rebel forces
now appear to be launching many of the disputed
attacks. Black African rebels have stolen camels from Arab tribes,
kidnapped civilians and attacked police stations”. [250]
The African Union also stated that “It
appears…that there are
some problems with the chain of command of
some of the movements, especially the SLA.” [251]
The SLA representative to the African Union, Abdou Abdallah Ismail,
denied any such problem, and insisted that the SLA “has
full control over its commanders”. Ismail
was clearly aware of international criticism: “I
want to send a message to the international community. My guys
are not going to act like bandits. We’re a movement.
How can we act like thieves and protect people?” [252]
The New York Times also addressed
concerns about rebel command and- control: The problems are exacerbated by what appear to be contradictory bluster
and promises from the rebel camp. It remains unclear whether the
attack on Tawilah, for instance, was ordered from on high, or whether
it was the result of a flimsy chain of command…Their message
has not been consistent. Rebel leaders late this week scrambled
to publicize their commitment to a cease-fire, even after at least
one of their spokesmen earlier in the week declared the truce
to be over…The latest spate of hostage-taking
and attacks on government targets has brought unusually harsh criticism of the SLA…Whether rebel leaders are stepping up attacks for the
sake of trying to gain leverage at coming peace
talks in Abuja, or whether the attacks simply
signal a breakdown in their command-and-control structure also remains unknown. [253]
In the event, The New York Times reported the more benign view
of Tawila, “Whatever the case, it is
clear, say aid workers, United Nations officials
and senior Sudanese government officials, that the Sudan Liberation
Army remains a poorly organized insurgency, one whose rank-and-file
fighters may be unaware of the promises made by their political
leaders.” [254]
There is also a question mark with regard to the political
cohesion and coordination even within the
political leadership. Reuters has noted that“ Internal
differences, conflicting goals and a lack of coordination among Sudanese
rebel groups are obstructing international efforts to reach
a peace agreement with the government over
Darfur, diplomats and aid workers say.” [255]
Reuters quoted an African Union official as saying:“ The
factionalism of the (rebel) leadership almost derailed talks
in N’Djamena and set back the talks
in Addis Ababa.” Reuters
also pointed to the problem of “a pattern
of often contradictory rebel statements from spokesmen
who change frequently.” This was described
by the AfricanUnion official as “a dilemma” which
would get worse: “This is particularly
a concern with JEM…With JEM we have had
splinter groups claiming to talk for the whole
group…it’s
difficult to know who talks for the group.” The
Sudan Liberation Army was also said to lack cohesion.
SLA chairman Abd al-Wahid Mohamed al-Nur has admitted that “There
are mistakes sometimes from some officials who say things that
are not our policy.” Reuters observed that “[al-Nur]
said he was the overall leader of the group
and took the final decision in political matters.
But another SLM leader, Minni Arcua Minnawi, had previously told
reporters he was the leader of the group.” An aid
worker who deals with the SLA leadership on
a regular basis noted: “It
is often unclear who speaks for the group
or what section of the group they speak for. It is
also unclear who speaks for the group at all and who doesn’t.” [256]
There
would in any instance also appear to be major political differences between
the two main rebel groups in Darfur. As early as May 2004,
the International Crisis Group quoted a leading
SLA member as saying: “
Continued coordination is unclear, because they [JEM] have
some ambiguous political backing.” [257]
In October 2004, Reuters reported that: “
The rebel movements negotiating with Sudan’s Islamist
government to try to end the 20-month-old
conflict in Darfur have been unable to come up
with a common political framework, presenting separate documents to
mediators instead.” [258] The New York Times has noted
of the SLA that “splits are inevitable
with its cousin rebel factions”. [259]
The issue of the separation of religion
and state has been cited as a major area of divergence
between the two groups. Reuters noted that “the
leadership of the two rebel groups have
very different backgrounds. JEM’s
leaders are widely believed to have retained
prior links with Sudan’s
opposition leader and Islamic ideologist
Hassan al-Turabi, an advocate of Sharia law.” [260]
In addition to tension between the Justice and Equality Movement
and SLA, it appears that JEM itself has split. This resulted
in the emergence of the break-away National
Movement for Reform and Development. In November 2004 it
was reported that clashes between rebel
fighters had left 20 dead and dozens injured. [261]
There is, therefore, clearly
the danger that rebellion in Darfur may encourage
the emergence of further armed groups, in Darfur and in other parts
of Sudan. A number of new groups, of varying credibility, have appeared
on the scene. [262] Reuters has reported, for example, that the African
Union presently “recognizes the SLA and the
other main rebel group, the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM), and the National Movement
for Reform and Development, which split from JEM and agreed
to respect a cease-fire after talks with Khartoum”.
Reuters quoted Major-General Festus
Okonkwo, the Nigerian commander of AU forces in
Darfur, on the issue of new groups: “If we recognize
too many groups, then more groups
will take up arms. So the AU will not recognize any more groups.” [263]
There is another difficulty
which has posed a problem in the search for peace
in Darfur – those foreign governments and constituencies
who, for their own political interest,
would wish to see continuing conflict in Darfur
and the continued destabilisation of Sudan in Darfur and elsewhere.
Eritrea is an obvious candidate in this respect. The International
Crisis Group has also commented upon the sometimes less than
helpful role played by international observers at the peace
talks themselves, citing one observer
as saying “The process
had too many players. It was too hard
to keep the international actors united. They were
a fractured, agenda-ridden group. It was a political catfight.
The observers never settled their own
differences.”
[264]
There were also accounts of how the
Darfur rebels were being encouraged by United States officials
to procrastinate during peace talks in late 2004. [265]
The simple fact which must be borne in mind
by those who wish to see peace in Darfur is that
the rebel movements may believe that it is not in their
best interests to have peace. Continued war means a continuing humanitarian
crisis which in turn means continuing pressure on Khartoum,
with rebel hopes that this might translate out into some form of
foreign military intervention which the SLA or JEM would then
be able to exploit domestically. [266] This would
at least in part explain the reluctance of both
rebel movements either to engage in any meaningful negotiations
or then to abide by any commitments they may have signed.
Other Government Measures
In addition to clear and
unambiguous engagement within the peace process,
the government has also been party to a number of other measures
aimed at stabilising Darfur. On 7 April 2004, the Sudanese government
announced the formation of a Ministerial Committee “to end
security and relief problems in Darfur region”.
The Committee was entrusted with the following:
to control and disarm militias and non-regular
forces that target the civilian population or hinder the
delivery of relief; to open all relief
corridors and to secure unimpeded access to the area
for humanitarian assistance; to provide basic needs for affected population
in the area; and to create a conducive atmosphere for the stabilization
and normalization of the situation in Darfur. The Committee
visited the affected areas on 8 April 2004, accompanied by the
Ambassadors of USA, EU, and France, as well as representatives
of UN agencies. The Government informed
the African Union that the representatives
of the international organisations had confirmed an improvement
in the humanitarian situation. On 10 April 2004, the Sudanese
government announced an immediate
investigation to prosecute those responsible for the violence
in the Darfur region. In May 2004, President Omar Bashir
announced the setting up of a human rights
commission to probe allegations of human rights
violations in Darfur. The committee is chaired by former
Chief Justice Dafallah al-Haj Yousif and
made up of noted anti-government human
rights advocate Ghazi Suleiman, retired police general Hassan Ahmed
Sidik, former army general al-Sir Mohammed Ahmed, a former commander
of the Western Command, Dr Fatma Abdul-Mahmoud, National
Assembly member, Hamadto Mukhtar, Chairman of the National
Assembly`s Human Rights Committee, Nazir Mohammed Sarour
Mohammed Ramli, a representative of the Darfur administration) and
Fuad Eid, a former administrator. It would probe especially
claims relating to killings, torture,
the burning of villages and the seizure of property. [267]
In July 2004 it was also announced that the Minister of Justice
had established three committees to investigate allegations
of rape in Darfur. [268] In August the justice
ministry established a special committee
made of female judges, police and justice ministry officials
to investigate rape cases.
The government had helped
facilitate numerous visits from human rights organisations
and experts. From 21 April-2 May 2004, for example, a UN
High Commission on Human Rights investigative team visited Darfur.
Amnesty International delegations visited Darfur in January 2003
and in September 2004. A delegation from the African Human Rights
Commission visited Darfur in July 2004. The Special Rapporteur on
violence against women, Professor Yakin Ertürk, visited
Darfur from 25 September to 2 October 2004.
In May 2004, the government
announced a number of measures aimed at facilitating
the arrival of humanitarian aid in Darfur and enabling waraffected civilians
in Darfur to return to their home areas and to prepare for
the coming agricultural season. These measures were said to be“
aimed at reducing the impacts of war and facilitating the
work of Sudan’s partners in the humanitarian aid
field”. To this end the government relaxed entry visas for aid workers entering
Sudan. [269]
In June 2004, the Sudanese
President appointed the Interior Minister, Major-General
Abdul-Rahim Mohammed Hussein, as his Special Representative
for Darfur, to oversee the implementation of government measures. [270]
On 18 June, the President announced seven decrees: a declaration
mobilising all sectors of government to restore law and order in
Darfur; the establishment of special courts to prosecute criminals;
the deployment of police forces to protect
villages to enable civilians to return home;
all ministries, particularly Agriculture and Finance, to assist
with making available seeds for the coming planting season; all relevant
ministries were instructed to implement the contingency plan for
the development and provision of basic services in Darfur; calls
for all governmental and non-governmental
organisations to provide humanitarian assistance
to internally-displaced people; and the promotion
of a national conference to promote a national dialogue.
In
early July 2004, the Sudanese government announced that it
had drawn
up plans to help more than a million people who fled their homes to
return voluntarily and provide them with security. The returnees
will be provided with services, shelter materials
and food that will be adequate for three months. [271]
This was followed up with further measures.
On 6 July 2004, the Sudanese President’s
Special Representative in Darfur,
Major-General Hussein, issued 15 decrees aimed
at addressing and alleviating the crisis in Darfur.
These addressed security issues,
the easing of aid and relief access to Darfur, human rights
monitoring and the presence and work of African Union observers. [272]
On 3 July, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail and the UN
Secretary-General signed a joint communiqué establishing
a Joint Implementation Mechanism, to oversee the
carrying out of a mutually agreed plan of action.
In addition to the government and United Nations, participation in
JIM includes several partner countries and members of the League
of Arab States, as well as Nigeria representing
the African Union in its capacity as current AU
chairman. It has since met on a number of occasions.
A joint verification mission visited Darfur in late July and ascertained
that the government was holding to a policy of voluntary returns
and that humanitarian access had improved. [273] It was realised that
commitments to disarm all militias within thirty days was unrealistic,
as noted by the Secretary-General on 30 August 2004: “
Making an area the size of Darfur, with the amount of armed men
and violent recent history, safe and secure for
all civilians takes more than 30 days.” [274]
The government committed itself to three steps: ending all offensive
military operations; identifying parts of Darfur that could be made
safe within 30 days; and identifying those militias over whom
it had control and instructing them to lay down
their weapons. Areas in each state were identified,
and as agreed through JIM, the government commenced
the large-scale deployment of some 6,000 policemen to maintain
security and protect displaced persons’ camps
in Darfur. They would be tasked with assisting
with the delivery of relief supplies and the provision
of medical supplies. [275] An additional 2,000 policemen were
deployed in mid-August. [276] By the end of 2004, some 12,000 policemen
had been moved from other areas of Sudan into Darfur. The United
Nations noted that “the enlarged police force appears
to be of a well disciplined quality.”
In his 30 August report, the
Secretary-General noted that “the
disarming of members of the [Popular Defense
Forces]…has started.
The second joint verification mission observed
a demobilization ceremony of about 300 PDF soldiers in West
Darfur…In South Darfur, the joint verification mission
on 27 August inspected 157 arms in Kass that had been given up
by members of the PDF the previous day, and was told about
similar efforts in other locations in South Darfur.” [277]
In keeping with the United
Nations plan of action, the government convened
a conference of local leaders from Darfur. This was held in Khartoum
from 11-12 August. The conference reviewed draft legislation on “the
native administration of the three Darfur states”.
The United Nations Secretary-General noted
that “the participants
adequately covered the three Darfur states,
and all major tribes and the interests of both
pastoralists and nomads were well represented. Most of the traditional
local leaders were present, including leaders who were known to
have political views at variance with those of the Government.” The Native
Administration Law for the Three Darfur States was passed
by presidential decree on 19 August 2004
and the United Nations states that it “contains
criteria for the selection of local administrators and provisions
relating to administrative, security, judicial, executive
and other issues. The law provides for
a general framework…to
help address the conflict in Darfur in a transparent and sustainable manner.” [278]
In building the case for peace
in Darfur, the government convened a meeting
in Nyala, South Darfur, for the leaders of six tribes caught
up in the conflict. The tribes agreed to a
ceasefire and to waive claims for compensation and blood money. [279]
The United Nations has noted
the government’s commitment
to a peaceful solution to the Darfur conflict.
In his February 2005 comments to the United
Nations Security Council meeting on Sudan, the UN Envoy
to Sudan, Mr Jan Pronk, stated: “The good news
is that the government has shown a willingness
to negotiate, toughly, but seriously, on
the basis of principles concerning the sharing of power and
wealth that have resulted in the Naivasha peace agreement.
The Government has recently confirmed
its commitment to such talks. President Bashir and
Vice President Taha have made it quite clear: the objective
is peace through negotiations, in Darfur
and elsewhere in Sudan.” [280] By contrast,
the UN Secretary-General’s February 2005
assessment of the preceding six month
period with regard to the rebel movements was bleak: “Over
this period, the rebel movements have become less cooperative
in talks. Their attacks on police have increased and often seemed
intended to invite retaliation.” [281] In a further
complication, tensions between SLA military
commanders and the exiled political leadership
resurfaced in early 2005. The military leadership were reported
to have distanced themselves from the SLA chairman Abd al- Walid
Mohamed al-Nur and the Secretary-General Minni Arkou Minawi.
[282 )
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