DARFUR IN PERSPECTIVE
By Professor David Hoile
Published by The European - Sudanese Public Affairs Council
Chapter 8
THE DARFUR ROAD-MAP
The political solution
to Darfur ultimately lies in the federal process within Naivasha
that is the decentralisation of power.
US State Department official Charles Snyder [672]
The positions of all sides on the issues are the same. They share a lot in the area of
power sharing. They all agree on a united Sudan. They all agree on [the] need to
devolve more power downwards
Sudanese government official [673]
Douglas H. Johnson, perhaps the best historian of Sudan’s recent
conflicts, has provided a particularly apt analogy for events in Darfur.
Sudan’s civil war reminded him “of his own great-grandmother’s tales
of survival in the border states during the American Civil War, where
the great motivating principles of that horrific conflict were scarcely
evident in the behaviour of its local protagonists. My home-state of
Missouri (to which my great-grandmother fled in the mistaken hope of
finding greater security) was then the battleground of the most vicious
internal guerrilla war in American history, where all the cruelties of civil
conduct were magnified.” [674] Johnson cites the American historian
Michael Fellman’s characterisation of that conflict as “the war of ten
thousand nasty incidents [where] justice was impossible” and in which
“restraint and forbearance had not been the guiding qualities”. [675] And in
its mishmash of different forces – federal, Confederate, government,regular, state, county and irregular, diverse militia – together with ad
hoc armed bands of raiders and criminal and semi-criminal gangs that
produced the likes of the James and Younger brothers, all within a
framework of national conflict, local grievances and vendettas, the
Missouri border wars provide some sort of an insight into the Darfur
crisis. And, for all the bitterness and violence at the time, peace and
reconciliation did come, and unity and political consensus were reestablished.
The international community’s response to the crisis in Darfur,
especially media coverage, has been varied and in some instances shortsighted.
The key question that has not been asked much is a simple one.
Where does the international community want to be two years from now
with regard to Darfur and Sudan? There are two related questions. How
do we get from A to B and what are the obstacles. In the rush to
judgement on Darfur – premature, misguided and misinformed in some
cases – we are losing sight of these key questions.
The reality of the Darfur crisis is all too apparent. There has been a
vicious civil war in Darfur between two rebel movements and the
Sudanese government. It has truly been a “war of ten thousand nasty
incidents”. Tens of thousands of people have died and hundreds of
thousands of civilians have been displaced in the conflict. It has been a
human disaster.
Any attempt to shape a road-map must start with two words of caution.
To address the Darfur crisis it is essential that events in Darfur are
evaluated as objectively as possible. To do so observers must cut away
the propaganda, media sensationalism and pressure group politics –
especially within the United States – that has already distorted
perceptions of the Darfur crisis and Sudan. That Darfur has been
enmeshed in propaganda is clear. This study has touched upon some
examples. There have been allegations of genocide, ethnic cleansing and
the use of chemical weapons in Darfur. Propaganda such as this, while
serving any number of short-term political goals, complicates an already
complex issue. Any solution to the Darfur crisis has to break through
this propaganda wall and move on. Such propaganda merely serves to encourage rebel groups in obstructing peace talks in the unfounded hope
of some form of outside military intervention. And secondly, as outlined
by Richard Dowden, “Darfur may be a remote province but its politics
link directly into the government in Khartoum. What happens here may
lead to a fragmentation of the whole country. A settlement on terms too
favourable to the rebels could spark revolts among other marginalised
peoples.” [676]
Objectives
What are the objectives that would be set for a Darfur road-map? Again
they are clear. To stabilise Africa’s largest country. To stabilise Darfur
for humanitarian aid access, end the fighting – or at the very least put it
on hold – while negotiating a political solution to the crisis, re-establish
the rule of law in Darfur, and where possible identify and pursue those
people guilty of crimes and war crimes, assist those communities that
have been displaced to return to their homes, rebuild and develop
Darfur’s infrastructure. It is also essential for Sudan to complete its
long-standing goal of normalising its international relations.
Ceasefire and Peace Talks
We are fortunate in that a peace framework exists. Internationally
brokered peace talks have taken place in Chad, Ethiopia and Nigeria. An
African Union-mediated ceasefire agreement between the Government
and rebels was signed in early April 2004. [677] In Abuja in November
2004 the Government and rebel movements extended ceasefire and aid
access agreements. [678] These agreements provides for international
monitoring of the ceasefire. The presence of military observers from the
African Union is an essential part of any ceasefire arrangements and
their numbers must be increased when and where necessary to enforcepeace in Darfur. [679] The United Nations supports this involvement and
the European Union has played a key part in facilitating the AU
presence. [680]
At face value negotiating a political solution to the Darfur crisis should
not be difficult. [681] The two rebel movements claim that they began the
war because of the marginalisation and underdevelopment of Darfur.
JEM spokesmen, for example, have stated: “The regions should elect
their own government and hold it to account. The regions should have
their own constitutions. We’re not seeking to separate from our
country.” [682] SLA secretary-general Minni Arkou Minawi has
encapsulated his movement’s demands: “The SLM/A shall struggle to
achieve a decentralised form of governance based on the right of
Sudan’s different regions to govern themselves autonomously through a
federal or confederal system.” [683] The government has publicly
committed itself to a federal system of government in Darfur which
would “ensure” that Darfur states would “have their own
constitutions…elected governors [and] elected legislative assemblies” as
well as “suitable” Darfurian “participation in the central institutions”
and wealth sharing”. [684] This was also echoed by Dr Mustapha Osman
Ismail, the Sudanese foreign minister: “The people from Darfur state
should have the right to have a parliament, to have a governor, to have a
government to be elected by the people of Darfur.” [685] President Bashir
has also stated that Darfur will be ruled by local, tribal law, and not by
central legislation. [686] Taken at face value, these issues are be adequatelypeace in Darfur. [679] The United Nations supports this involvement and
the European Union has played a key part in facilitating the AU
presence. [680]
At face value negotiating a political solution to the Darfur crisis should
not be difficult. [681] The two rebel movements claim that they began the
war because of the marginalisation and underdevelopment of Darfur.
JEM spokesmen, for example, have stated: “The regions should elect
their own government and hold it to account. The regions should have
their own constitutions. We’re not seeking to separate from our
country.” [682] SLA secretary-general Minni Arkou Minawi has
encapsulated his movement’s demands: “The SLM/A shall struggle to
achieve a decentralised form of governance based on the right of
Sudan’s different regions to govern themselves autonomously through a
federal or confederal system.” [683] The government has publicly
committed itself to a federal system of government in Darfur which
would “ensure” that Darfur states would “have their own
constitutions…elected governors [and] elected legislative assemblies” as
well as “suitable” Darfurian “participation in the central institutions”
and wealth sharing”. [684] This was also echoed by Dr Mustapha Osman
Ismail, the Sudanese foreign minister: “The people from Darfur state
should have the right to have a parliament, to have a governor, to have a
government to be elected by the people of Darfur.” [685] President Bashir
has also stated that Darfur will be ruled by local, tribal law, and not by
central legislation. [686] Taken at face value, these issues are be adequatelyaddressed by the Naivasha formula, which has defined devolved
regional government in southern Sudan, a formula at the heart of the
January 2005 comprehensive peace agreement settling the long-running
north-south civil war. [687] Senior Sudanese government ministers have
stated that the Naivasha arrangements could be a model for Darfur.[688]
The key US State Department official on Sudan, Charles Snyder, has
also noted: “The political solution to Darfur ultimately lies in the federal
process within Naivasha that is the decentralisation of power.” [689] And,
should Darfur be endowed with as yet undiscovered and un-exploited oil
reserves, they should be subject to a wealth-sharing arrangement similar
to the southern formula.
Those civilians who have been displaced must be returned home to their
villages – villages which in many instances would need to have been
rebuilt – and where necessary improved upon, by the Sudanese
government and international community.
It is important to note that the north-south peace agreement is itself the
end result of a process of reform, liberalisation and engagement in
Sudan that can be traced back to the 1999 ouster of hard-line Islamist
leader Dr Hasan al-Turabi. In April and in mid-May 2000, towards the
end of the obstructive Clinton Administration, Khartoum restated its
readiness to enter into “an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire” and
to restart negotiations for the achievement of a lasting peace.
Throughout 2001, the Sudanese government repeatedly called for a
peaceful resolution of the southern conflict and called upon the SPLA to
do the same. [690] With the Bush Administration’s support, the ensuing
peace process resulted in the 2002 Machakos protocols and 2004
Naivasha agreement which were turned into the 2005 comprehensive
peace settlement.
It is essential that Sudan remains committed to the course of
normalisation of its relations with the international community that had
preceded the Darfur crisis. In 1999, for example, the European Union
entered into a political dialogue with Sudan, noting improvements
within the Sudanese situation. [691] There had also been a similar regional
shift in attitudes towards Sudan and the Sudanese conflict. [692] In 2001,
for example, Sudan held the presidency of both the regional
Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as the Community
of Sahel-Saharan States, a body which brings together eleven North
African states. [693] The then newly-elected Bush administration and Sudan
entered into a new relationship, with extensive Sudanese support in
counter-terrorism both before and after the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attacks within the United States. It is also clear that from 1999 onwards
the political situation within Sudan changed significantly. Conditions
have also changed domestically. The former prime minister, Umma
party leader and key opposition figure, Sadiq al-Mahdi, declared in
1999, for example, that: “There are now circumstances and
developments which could favour an agreement on a comprehensive
political solution". [694]
What are the Obstacles?
There are, of course, a number of real or potential obstacles along any
Darfur road-map. One of the obstacles has already been touched upon.
International perceptions of the crisis continue to be distorted by the sort
of propaganda claims that go hand-in-hand with all war and particularly
civil war – claims all too often echoed by a sensationalist media.
Unrealistic international demands, often fuelled by superficial press
coverage of the war, can result in the hardening of positions. The
international community must take an objective, well-informed position
on Darfur. Demands for 30-day “fixes” ill-serve the Darfur people and
weaken the credibility of those countries and international institutions
that stipulate such deadlines. There are, of course, any number of
political opportunists waiting to exploit any Western misjudgements on
Darfur – not least of which those Islamist extremists, internationally and
within Sudan, who would welcome any foreign military intervention in
the region as a pretext for another Iraq or Afghanistan-type conflict with
the West. If Darfur is turned into the next Afghanistan by these forces
responding to Western mistakes then once again it will be the people of
Darfur who will suffer the most. [695]
Another possible obstacle, itself accentuated by undemanding reporting,
is the superficial perception that the rebels are fighting againstmarginalisation and underdevelopment in Darfur. Alternative or
concurrent objectives have been suggested by independent observers
such as Ghazi Suleiman, and others. Suleiman has pointed to the
continuing role played in Sudan and particularly Darfur by the Islamist
leader Dr Turabi. Turabi had long been opposed to settling the civil war
in the south and any engagement with the United States. The war in
Darfur may well be an attempt by Islamists to derail reform in Sudan
and Sudan’s move towards the West. Should the objective of the
Islamist rebels in Darfur be the overthrow of the present Khartoum
government rather than power-sharing or devolution for Darfur, then the
rebel movements are unlikely to negotiate in good faith. Mediators have
already noted repeated rebel intransigence during peace talks.
The argument that the rebels may wish to see continuing war and chaos
in Darfur is at least partly confirmed by their constant attacks on
humanitarian convoys and their escalating obstruction, intimidation and
murder of humanitarian aid workers. They have also continued to show
ambivalence with regard to committing to or honouring humanitarian
aid agreements. [696] In these circumstances it will be difficult to persuade
all the anti-rebel militias in Darfur to stand down. The noted absence of
a coherent political agenda on the part of the Sudan Liberation Army is
another obstacle as is the question of rebel command-and-control over
their forces, and the possibility of Somalia-esque warlordism.
How Do We Get to Where We Want to Go?
It is essential that the ceasefire must be extended, enforced and
monitored. The mission of the African Union monitors must be
supported and assisted. The Sudanese government has repeatedly called
for the full deployment of these forces. Ceasefire monitoring and
verification teams which have so effectively policed the ceasefire in
southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains must also be introduced to Darfur. [697] The Darfur peace talks must be encouraged and all parties to
the conflict must be held to account by the international community.
While Khartoum appears to be eager to resolve the Darfur issue, any
rebel reluctance, by design or by way of opportunism, to engage in the
talks must be recognised and addressed by the international community.
Criminality in Darfur must be dealt with aggressively. Khartoum must
address the criminality and armed banditry that has undermined law and
order in Darfur. The humanitarian needs of those who have been
displaced must be met until those affected are able to return to their
homes. External involvement with, and support for, the Darfur rebels,
from Eritrea for example, must stop. Only concerted international
pressure can make this happen.
Criticism of the Sudanese government for a number of its actions in
Darfur is valid but it must be measured and properly focused. Knee-jerk
responses by Western countries and other sections of the international
community to sensationalist and often questionable claims about Darfur
serve only to enflame an already tense situation. They also endanger the
north-south peace process and have the potential of slowing Sudan’s reengagement
with the West as well as adversely colouring the image of
the West within the developing world.
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